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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the work of Jeremy Bentham and John
Stewart Mill reflected an early understanding of economics as utilitarianism: “It is the
greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.”
(Bentham, 1996). The writing of Bentham and Mill on utilitarianism informed the
modern-day model of microeconomics and serves as the inspiration for utility maximiza-
tion and social welfare functions. Both the standard microeconomic model of household
decision-making under scarcity and the notion of Pareto efficiency have their roots in
utilitarianism. Mill’s theory of individual worth and self-improvement, as the source of
true freedom, influences the thinking on development economists today. Amartya Sen,
who conceived the capabilities approach to development, describes the development pro-
cess as one of expanding freedom and capabilities for individuals to lead the kind of life
they value. In this early classical period of the economics, development economics was
at the center of the field of economics.
In this dissertation, I build from the foundation of intellectual history in the field of
microeconomics of development to understand problems of poverty in today’s developing
world. At the time of Bentham and Mill, poverty and industrialization made England
the developing country of study, whereas today, I write about Tanzania.
As of 2015, Tanzania was the twelfth largest economy in Africa, yet 68 percent of
1
2the population lives on less than $1.25 per day (World Bank, 2014). Despite important
economic reforms and a six percent growth rate in the last decade, poverty remains
widespread across the country. The Human Development Index (HDI), which is an ag-
gregate index of life expectancy, education, and income, places Tanzania in the bottom
quartile of all countries in the world in terms of total human development. Sixty three
percent of households have no access to piped water for drinking, and 67 percent of
households live in dwellings with a floor made of earth or sand (United Nations Devel-
opment Program, 2014). Life expectancy was 61 years in 2012, which reflects a ten year
increase since 2002. While 80 percent of primary school-age children were attending
school in 2012, chronic child malnutrition is estimated to be an underlying cause of over
one third of child deaths (under age 5).
Following the independence of Tanganyika in 1961 and Zanzibar in 1963, the two
regions merged in April 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Although unified
under the national language of Swahili, Tanzania’s diverse population comprises over
100 different tribal groups and languages. A high total fertility rate (5.1 births per
woman) and decreasing infant mortality rate have contributed to a rapidly growing
population. The total population may triple by 2050 if the current natality trends
continue (United Nations Population Division, 2015). This growth has also contributed
to a near doubling of the labor force between 2001 and 2012. Most of this labor force is
in the agricultural sector: in 2012, 80 percent of Tanzanians were working in agriculture.
This dissertation contributes to a growing body of research on the microeconomics
of development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fertility, labor market participation and agri-
culture are key components of the microeconomic development process in Tanzania. I
explore household and individual decisions in all three of these domains in Tanzania
through microeconomic analysis and impact evaluation. Both experimental and non-
experimental impact evaluations improve the public understanding of what works in
economic development.
This dissertation is organized as follows. For the first essay in Chapter 2, I explore
household fertility decisions by estimating the effect of a community family planning
education program on fertility behavior in the Meatu District. In Chapter 3, I investigate
3the effects of an entrepreneurship training program on financial literacy and employment
attitudes in the Kagera region. This essay is joint with Brooke Krause and David
Chapman. In Chapter 4, I analyze the impact of polygyny on agricultural productivity
in farming households across the country. This essay is joint with Amy Damon and
Vincent Siegerink. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
Chapter 2
His and Her Fertility Preferences:
An Experimental Evaluation of
Asymmetric Information in
Family Planning
2.1 Introduction
When men desire nearly three times as many additional children as their wives and pos-
sess most of the decision-making power in the household, the discordance of preferences
leads to excess fertility and welfare losses for wives, who bear almost all of the costs
of pregnancy and child-rearing. High rates of fertility persist in sub-Saharan Africa,
where, in 2013, the total fertility rate was 5.1 births per woman, relative to the total
fertility rate of 2.3 births per woman in the rest of the world (World Bank, 2014). The
rate in rural Tanzania stood even higher, at 8.4 births per woman (DHS, 2010). In
fact, if the current natality trends in Tanzania continue, its population will triple by
2050 (United Nations Population Division, 2015). The benefits of planned and spaced
births include positive outcomes for children, including better nutrition and more years
4
5of schooling (Do and Phung, 2010), and better maternal health (Winikoff, 1983; Norton,
2005). While previous economic studies indicate that high fertility is usually a conse-
quence of large desired family sizes (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980a,b; Moffitt, 2005), it
is not yet clear how high fertility is affected by heterogeneous spousal fertility desires.
According to the 2010 Tanzania Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), 27 percent
of rural Tanzanian women say that they would like to delay a birth by at least two
years but are not using contraception. This gap is even larger in the data collected for
this study. In the 2012 baseline household data from the Meatu district of northern
Tanzania, 76 percent of women report that they want to delay a birth by at least two
years but are not using contraception. Knowledge of fertility control is poor in this
context. Eighty percent of women believe that folkloric methods of birth control (such
as luck charms) are effective in preventing pregnancy. Additionally, husbands generally
have more pronatalist fertility preferences than their wives in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ezeh,
Seroussi, and Raggers, 1996). This preference is also confirmed in the Meatu household
survey, where women, on average, report desiring an additional 1.4 children and men
report desiring an additional 4.5 children. The lack of knowledge about family planning
methods combined with heterogeneous fertility preferences among spouses may prevent
women from achieving their desired family sizes.
This study addresses the problem of wives’ excess fertility by proposing two main re-
search questions. First, can the number of unwanted pregnancies be reduced through an
informational family planning program that reduces the psychosocial cost of contracep-
tives? And secondly, in the presence of heterogeneous spousal fertility preferences, what
is the effect of including husbands in family planning consultations? I measure the im-
pact of family planning worker household consultations through a small field experiment
that randomized the inclusion of husbands. The study sample includes approximately
600 randomly-selected households across 12 villages in the district of Meatu. I use a
conceptual framework based on non-cooperative game theory to explain fertility deci-
sions and make predictions about the effect of family planning information on fertility
behavior under different expectations about husbands’ violent behavior.
The main findings provide evidence of a trade-off between welfare gains for women
6and marital gains from better-aligned preferences. The family planning program reduced
psychosocial cost of contraception adoption and thus reduced pregnancies significantly
in the treatment group. Women who consulted with the family planning worker individ-
ually (without their husbands) had a significantly larger reduction in pregnancies than
women who consulted together with their husbands. Yet, the joint conversation about
family planning as part of the couples consultation also had an effect, reducing men’s
(relatively large) fertility desires. And, in contrast to predictions by the conceptual
framework, when women expect their husbands to be abusive, the asymmetric family
planning information (excluding husbands from consultations) has a negative effect on
pregnancies.
This study builds on a body of literature on the determinants of fertility choices
and intra-household bargaining. Service delivery through the decentralized provision of
sexual and reproductive health care using locally-based health workers has proven ef-
fective in rural areas of developing countries. The seminal experimental Matlab Project
in Bangladesh showed that through a community health worker program, poor popu-
lations reduced fertility rates and improved child health (Bhatia et al., 1980). Several
studies have documented the sizable impact of this particularly intensive program, and
showed that family planning efforts can affect fertility even in the absence of major so-
cioeconomic improvements (Bhatia et al., 1980; Joshi and Schultz, 2007; Sinha, 2005).
However, observational studies of changes in fertility in developing countries lack
random assignment of family planning policies or programs. When program placement
is not exogenous to the outcome, a number of unobservable factors (e.g. demand for
contraceptives, labor market, status of women) may lead to biased estimates of the pro-
gram impact (Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons, 1993; Molyneaux, 1994). This evaluation
challenge is particularly problematic amid economic development and rising levels of
income (Pritchett, 1994; Miller, 2009). Pritchett (1994) argued that the supply of fam-
ily planning services is not a dominant determinant of differing fertility rates because
fertility is largely determined by demand. And rising income and economic development
affect the main determinants of couples fertility desires: the relative costs of children
versus other goods, the couple’s income, and their preferences for children versus com-
peting forms of consumption (Becker, 1960). I overcome the evaluation challenge by
7implementing a randomized field experiment. Although the region may see rising in-
comes over the study period, the information provided in household family planning
consultations was randomly assigned to villages.
The role of husbands’ preferences in intra-couple fertility decisions has been eval-
uated through experimental designs that exploit random inclusion of men in family
planning consultations. Terefe and Larson (1993) first examined the experimental effect
of men in family planning decisions in urban Ethiopia and discovered that women who
consulted with a family planning nurse while their husbands were present were more
likely to adopt contraceptive methods than women who consulted with the nurse alone.
Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014), however, found contrasting evidence about the role of
husbands in Zambia. They administered a one-time voucher for access to discrete con-
traceptives through household family planning consultations. The authors found that
women who received the voucher privately (without their husbands) were more likely
to seek family planning services than women who received the voucher with their hus-
bands. The distinction in Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014) provides evidence of women
taking advantage of asymmetric information to behave strategically and achieve their
own desired fertility.
My contribution is three-fold. First, because the psychosocial cost of concealed
contraceptive use is borne over time, I expand on Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014) by
examining intra-household bargaining over fertility for a longer-term (fifteen-month)
family planning intervention, allowing more time for spousal discussion, in a region
where women have limited intra-household bargaining power (as empirically supported
by minimal decision-making ability within the household). Second, for the unresolved
question on whether husbands should be included in family planning education, my
results provide evidence of the positive cooperation effects of inclusion while also sup-
porting private welfare gains for women in individual consultations. And finally, I
provide evidence that women who experience intimate-partner violence are more likely
to seek out family planning services through the intervention and to reduce pregnancies.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the conceptual framework
for understanding spousal behavior. Section 2.3 presents the methods of implementation
8of the randomized field experiment. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical strategy for
measuring the program impact. Section 2.5 presents descriptive statistics. Section 2.4
presents and discusses the empirical results, and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, I develop a framework that describes inter-spousal family planning deci-
sions to make predictions about behavior that I test in the empirical analysis. The basic
model is similar to the non-cooperative framework used in Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2014),
although I simplify the model payoffs in order to explicitly solve for best response func-
tions and then examine the changing effect of husbands’ behavior. This model predicts
two key testable hypotheses: (1) a reduction in the psychosocial cost of contraception
adoption leads to an increase in the use of contraceptives (with a corresponding reduc-
tion in pregnancies); and (2) whether women adopt contraceptives depends on their
expectations of their husbands’ violent behavior.
2.2.1 Non-cooperation and Inefficiency
The collective model of the household describes two agents making decisions that affect
one another (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981). The weights on
agents’ utility functions are thought to be affected by external factors such as income.
Through bargaining over household resources, the couple reaches decisions that are
Pareto efficient. The consequences of intra-household bargaining have been empirically
observed in fertility decisions, household finances and investments in children (Thomas,
1990; Duflo, 2000; Rangel, 2006) However, a key assumption for efficiency in collec-
tive bargaining is mutual knowledge of each others’ preferences, resources and choices,
which includes perfect information and perfect contracts between spouses. According to
baseline Meatu data, most couples (65 percent) have never had any conversation about
fertility desires or family planning, so it is unlikely that the couples have bargained
efficiently to the point of reaching a binding agreement. Further, the assumption of
9efficiency in collective bargaining has been rejected by empirical evidence, especially in
Sub-Saharan Africa (Duflo and Udry, 2004; Udry, 1996).
Rasul (2008) frames a model of collective bargaining over fertility and finds that in-
vestments in fertility are efficient only if couples agree to a contract, or binding commit-
ment, on the number of children to have. Despite this, the empirical evidence indicated
that all types of couples bargain without commitment. Referencing the hold-up prob-
lem, Rasul (2008) concludes that without commitment, the influence of each spouse’s
fertility preferences depends on the individual’s bargaining power within the marriage
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 2008).1 Unequal levels of bargaining
power allow for opportunistic behavior when one spouse is exposed to private informa-
tion. Individuals have been shown to use money and information differently when given
the opportunity to hide these resources from their spouse (Castilla and Walker, 2013;
Aker, McClelland, and Tierney, 2014). Thus, under the collective model, asymmetric
information between spouses is a potential source of inefficient household decisions and
inefficient investments in fertility (Ashraf, Field, and Lee, 2014; Kebede et al., 2013).
The evidence of unsuccessful fertility contracting between couples (Rasul, 2008), the
potential advantage of private information about contraceptives, and evidence from the
Meatu context suggest a non-cooperative fertility bargaining framework with incomplete
information. The non-cooperative framework does not assume efficiency at the outset
and allows for limited commitment and asymmetric information about resources, choices
and preferences. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) provide the original framework for a non-
cooperative household model with limited commitment and Chen (2013) expands the
model in the case of imperfect information.
In the non-cooperative model without commitment, each person’s action is a best
response to his or her spouse’s actions. I characterize an extensive form game of incom-
plete information. The husband (H) and wife (W ) cannot reach a contract on fertility
behavior, so they choose actions that maximize their own payoffs. The players in the
1The hold-up problem results when agents refrain from cooperation and do not reach efficient con-
tracts due to unequal levels of bargaining power.
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game include Nature, Wife, and Husband. Nature moves first and makes contracep-
tion available (A = 1) with probability α, or unavailable (A = 0).2 The availability of
contraceptives is observed only by the wife. She observes Nature’s action and, if con-
traceptives are available, makes the second decision, choosing to adopt contraception
(C = 1) with probability κ, or not (C = 0). The husband also does not observe this
action.3 If contraceptives are not available, she does not take contraceptives (A = 0
implies C = 0). If contraceptives are not adopted, Nature moves again in deciding if a
birth will take place (B = 1) with probability β, or no birth (B = 0). If contraceptives
are adopted, no birth takes place (C = 1 implies B = 0). The husband observes this
final action of Nature and is allowed the possibility to feel aggrieved in response to a
no birth outcome (husbands are assumed to be pronatalist) and thus choose to punish
(P = 1) with probability pi, or not to punish (P = 0).4 In this context, punishments
can be understood as intimate partner violence, which is prevalent in this district. In
the model, the husband uses the threat of violence in attempt to convince her not to
take contraceptives.5 If a birth occurs, the husband does not punish (B = 1 implies
P = 0).
The players, actions (in capital letters), probabilities (under each node) and payoffs
(on the far right) can be viewed in Figure 2.1. Because this is an extensive form game
of incomplete information, it is useful to outline what each player knows and does not
know. The wife knows the availability of contraceptives (A), whether she has adopted
them (C), whether a birth has occurred (B). She does not know whether the husband
will punish (P ), but she does know the probability that he will punish (pi). The husband
knows whether or not a birth has occurred. He does not know whether contraceptives
are available (A) or whether his wife has taken them (C), but he forms beliefs about
the availability (α) and the likelihood that she will take them (κ). He also knows the
2Nature is a game theoretical representation of luck. While in reality, availability of contraceptives
is determined by health provisions and societal acceptance, these outside factors are simplified and
represented by Nature in this framework.
3The most popular contraceptive methods in Tanzania are quarterly injections (e.g. Depo Provera),
the pill or female sterilization. Because condoms are not popular in this region, the model assumes that
women chose to adopt female-centered contraception.
4He punishes through a process that Hart (2008) refers to as ”shading”, in which the husband inflicts
negative behavior on his wife as a result of feeling short-changed by the outcomes.
5In fact, 35 percent of women in the baseline survey had experienced intimate partner violence and
a few women in focus group discussions recalled threats of violence related to contraceptive use.
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range of these probabilities (0 ≤ α ≤ 1; 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1). The wife’s choice variable is C and
the husband’s choice variable is P , which they both determine by maximizing their own
expected utilities. The final outcomes are represented by the nodes on the right side of
the figure with corresponding payoffs displayed as (H,W ).
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework Game
Birth
Birth
Nature NatureWife (W) Husband (H)
𝑨 = 𝟏
𝑨 = 𝟎
𝑪 = 𝟎
𝑪 = 𝟎
𝑩 = 𝟏
𝑩 = 𝟎
𝑩 = 𝟎
𝑩 = 𝟎
𝑩 = 𝟏
𝑷 = 𝟏
𝑷 = 𝟎
𝑷 = 𝟎
𝑷 = 𝟎
𝑷 = 𝟏
𝑷 = 𝟏
𝑪 = 𝟏
𝝁𝟏
(𝒖𝒉, 𝒖𝒘)
(−𝒄𝒑, −𝒍)
(−𝒄𝒑, −𝒍)
(𝟎, 𝟎)
(𝟎,𝒖𝒘 − 𝒄𝒄)
 (𝒌𝒑 − 𝒄𝒑, 𝒖𝒘 − 𝒍 − 𝒄𝒄
(𝒖𝒉, 𝒖𝒘)
(𝟎, 𝟎)
𝝁𝟐
𝟏 − 𝝁𝟏 − 𝝁𝟐
The payoffs to W depend on her utility of a giving birth to a child now (uw),
her utility of delaying the birth of a child (uw),
6 the (psycho-social) cost of adopting
contraception (cc), and the utility loss imposed by a punishing husband (l). W is
assumed to prefer a delayed birth, uw > uw. The highest payoff for W is in the case
of taking contraception, delaying a birth and not experiencing punishment. Her lowest
payoff is in the case of not taking contraceptives yet also not giving birth. The payoffs
to taking contraceptives, however, depend on the probability of punishment, pi.
6This term captures the utility of a delayed birth for women, but it also represents the confidence
that a woman has knowing that she will not get pregnant at this time. Although she may not have a
birth when she does not take contraception, she does not gain the utility of uw in those cases because
she knows the likelihood of a birth is high and that this is determined by nature (luck).
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The payoffs to H depend on the utility of a birth (uh), the gain he receives from
punishing when she is using contraception (kp)
7 minus the additional cost he bears of
being a punishing husband (cp). The cost of being a punishing husband is not large
enough to lower his utility because the gain from punishing is at least as large as this
cost (kp ≥ cp). The highest payoff for H is in the case of a birth, while his lowest payoff
is in the case of no birth and imposing punishment.
The payoffs to each player depend on the framework’s parameters, but can be ranked
from highest to lowest utility.
−l < uw < 0 < uw − pil − cc < uw − cc for pi < X (wife) (2.2.1)
For some value of X, such that 0 ≤ X ≤ 1 (2.2.2)
−cp < 0 < kp − cp < uh (husband) (2.2.3)
2.2.2 Best Response Functions
The husband’s expected utility can be defined in terms of parameters and probabilities.
For simplicity sake, I use µ1, µ2 and (1 − µ1 − µ2) to represent H’s beliefs that he
is at each subgame choice set (decision node). The top, middle and bottom decision
nodes are informationally equivalent, although his beliefs may vary. In this case, µ1 =
α(1−κ)(1−β) (H ′s top decision node), µ2 = ακ(1−β) (H ′s middle decision node) and
1−µ1−µ2=(1−α)(1− β) (H ′s bottom decision node). The husband does not observe
A or C; he only observes B, whether a birth has occurred. He has beliefs, though,
about the probability of available contraceptives and the probability of his wife taking
contraceptives. Because the husband does not punish if a child is born, his decision
of whether to punish depends only on his expected utility function for the payoffs and
probabilities that involve no birth. The game results in the following expected utilities
7Although the husband does not directly observe A, and thus cannot know that he is punishing
while she is using contraceptives, he can gain utility from kp based on his own belief that he is correct
(which is a function of α and κ).
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for the husband to punishing, P = 1, and not punishing, P = 0:
E[UP=1h ] = µ1 ∗ (−cp) + µ2 ∗ (kp − cp) + (1− µ1 − µ2) ∗ (−cp) (2.2.4)
E[UP=0h ] = µ1 ∗ (0) + µ2 ∗ 0 + (1− µ1 − µ2) ∗ 0 (2.2.5)
To solve for H ′s best response function and determine the conditions under which
he will punish, I first define the indifference surface. Based on µ1 and µ2, this surface
expresses H ′s indifference between choosing P = 1 or P = 0.
E[UP=1h ] = E[U
P=0
h ] (2.2.6)
µ1 ∗ (−cp) + µ2 ∗ (kp − cp) + (1− µ1 − µ2) ∗ (−cp) = 0 (2.2.7)
µ2 =
cp
kp
ακ(1− β) = cp
kp
The husband is indifferent between choosing P = 1 or P = 0 when the above condition
is true. The husband prefers to punish when: ακ(1−β) > cpkp . Intuitively, this indicates
that if the probability of W taking contraceptives when they are available and not having
a birth are larger than the cost-benefit ratio of being a difficult husband, then he will
punish. The husband is more likely to punish when he believes it is highly likely that
his wife will have access to, and desire for, contraception. His best response function σh
follows.
σh =

pi = 1, µ2 >
cp
kp
pi ∈ [0, 1], µ2 = cpkp
pi = 0, µ2 <
cp
kp
Next, I solve for the wife’s best response function to determine the conditions under
which she will choose to take contraceptives. I define her indifference surface through
expected utility of her actions. The wife’s choice between taking contraceptives, C = 1,
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or not, C = 0, results in the following expected utilities:
E[UC=1w ] = pi ∗ (uw − l − cc) + (1− pi) ∗ (uw − cc) (2.2.8)
E[UC=0w ] = (1− β) ∗ pi ∗ (−l) + (1− β) ∗ (1− pi) ∗ 0 + βuw (2.2.9)
Based on the probabilities and payoffs of each choice, her indifference surface can be
defined by solving for the conditions that equate the expected utilities:
E[UC=1w ] = E[U
C=0
w ]
uw − pil − cc = βuw − (1− β)pil
cc = uw − β(uw + pil) (2.2.10)
The wife is indifferent between choosing C = 1 or C = 0 when the above condition
is true. She will choose contraceptives when cc < uw − β(uw + pil). In other words, she
will take contraception when the cost of adopting is not too high. Her best response
function, σ(w), is written more formally as:
σw =

κ = 1, cc < uw − β(uw + pil)
κ ∈ [0, 1], cc = uw − β(uw + pil)
κ = 0, cc > uw − β(uw + pil)
Testable Hypothesis 1
An important observation here is that as the psychosocial cost of contraception (cc)
decreases, the woman is more likely to adopt contraception. This testable hypothesis
predicts how the first research question will be answered. In the experimental context,
although contraceptives are free, the psychosocial cost of adopting contraceptives (e.g.
acquiring health information and defying social stigma) may be preventing women from
acheiving desired fertility. This psychosocial cost is lowered through the family planning
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intervention, as health information is brought to individuals in their home and conver-
sations with a trusted community member reduce the social stigma of contraceptives.
I test whether women in the treatment groups are more likely to adopt contraceptives
and reduce pregnancies than women in the control group.
2.2.3 Characterization of Equilibria
Here I will characterize the Bayesian perfect equilibria of this game (three pure strategies
and a mixing strategy). I define each equilibrium as a pair of the players’ actions,
[H,W ] and discuss each possible solution. I begin by conditions for the husband to
be indifferent between punishing, P = 1, and not punishing, P = 0. The husband’s
indifference surface can be reduced to:
µ2 =
cp
kp
I first discern the equilibria solutions when the husband is violent. Based on conditions
derived in the wife’s best response functions, the equilibrium strategy [P = 1, C = 1] is
subgame perfect equilibria if:
cc < uw − β(uw + l) (2.2.11)
In order for the equilibrium strategy [P = 1, C = 1] to be a Bayesian perfect equilibrum,
the conditions of their actions must be supported by beliefs. Since this strategy implies
he will punish and she will use contraceptives, I apply his belief about µ2 and infer that:
α ≥ cp
kp
(2.2.12)
If both 2.2.11 and 2.2.12 hold, then the solution [P = 1, C = 1] is a Bayesian perfect
equilibrium. Next, I determine whether [P = 1, C = 0] can be a subgame perfect
equilibrium. If the husband knew that the wife was playing C = 0, based on his best
response function, he would never choose the lower payoffs associated with P = 1.
Therefore, sequential rationality implies the solution [P = 1, C = 0] cannot be subgame
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perfect. Within the second research question on whether husbands should be included in
family planning consultations, I explore two testable hypotheses related to expectations
on the husbands behavior. When the husband is likely to punish, how will the loss
he imposes have an effect on contraceptive use? I explore how her best response may
change in the case where he is likely to be a punishing husband by varying pi. She has
beliefs about the value of pi based on prior experiences. I compare UC=1w (pi = 1) to
UC=0w (pi = 1), using equation 2.2.8 and 2.2.9.
E[UC=0w (pi = 1)] = uw − l − cc <> βuw − (1− β)l = E[UC=0w (pi = 1)] (2.2.13)
l > uw +
uw + cc
β
(2.2.14)
Testable Hypothesis 2a
When the husband is likely to punish (pi = 1), the threat of imposing l is effective
in inducing the wife to not take contraception. In 2.2.13, we can see that l has a larger
negative effect on the left hand side (when taking contraceptives). For any values of
cc and β, a one unit increase in l will reduce W ’s expected utility by one. On the
right hand side, l reduces her utility by (1− β), having a relatively less negative effect.
So, she would choose C = 0. In this case, his threat of abuse is effective in affecting
her behavior: l will make the wife choose not to adopt contraception. This is the last
testable hypothesis. When women expect husbands to be abusive, they would be less
likely to adopt contraceptives and reduce pregnancies.
Next, I give the conditions for equilibria solution when the husband is not violent.
Applying sequential rationality to the wife’s best response function, the equilibrium
strategy [P = 0, C = 0] can be subgame perfect equilibria if:
cc ≥ uw − β(uw) (2.2.15)
This strategy implies that she will not use contraceptives, thus applying Bayes rule of
supporting beliefs implies that µ2 = 0. The players actions remain best responses given
the updated beliefs, so [P = 0, C = 0] is a Bayesian perfect equilibrium. Likewise,
applying sequential rationality to the wife’s best response function, I determine the
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conditions for [P = 0, C = 1] to be subgame perfect:
cc ≥ uw − β(uw) (2.2.16)
Adding to this condition, this solution will be a Bayesian perfect equilibrium if the
players’ actions are supported by their beliefs. In this case, knowing that she is using
contraceptives and applying the husband’s belief about µ2 implies that:
α ≤ cp
kp
(2.2.17)
If 2.2.17 holds, then [P=0, C=1] is a Bayesian perfect equilibrium.8
Expanding on the second research question, I explore the conditions necessary for
the wife to choose contraceptives given that the husband is expected to never punish. I
compare her payoffs to each choice under the H chooses P = 0. This is the comparison
of EUC=1w (pi = 0) to EU
C=0
w (pi = 0), applying pi = 0 to equation 2.2.8 and 2.2.9. Taking
contraception will be optimal when:
E[UC=1w (pi = 0)] = uw − cc > βuw = UC=0w (pi = 0) (2.2.18)
cc < uw − βuw (2.2.19)
Testable Hypothesis 2b
Equation 2.2.19 indicates that if the husband is not going to punish his wife, the wife will
take contraceptives when the cost of doing so is small relative to a function of her utility
of delayed birth less the expected utility of an early birth. Note that this definition of
the conditions for a [P = 0, C = 1] equilibrium depend only on her own utility functions
and the probability of a birth, not on the loss of punishment. The husband’s threats to
induce her to avoid contraception will not be effective (will not change her behavior) if
she believes the probability of him being a punishing husband is 0. Testing the effect of
the treatment under different expectations of his behavior provides insight into whether
husbands should be included in family planning consultations. When women do not
8The mixing strategy is also a Bayesian perfect equilibrium when the following two conditions hold.
(1) uw − β(uw + l) > cc > uw − βuw and (2) ακακ+α(1−κ)(1−β)+(1−α)(1−β) = µ2 =
cp
kp
.
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expect husbands to be abusive, they would be more likely to adopt contraceptives and
reduce pregnancies.
2.3 Methods and Procedures
The data for this study come from a household survey of 660 households across 12 vil-
lages in Meatu District of northern Tanzania. The sample was drawn in the following
manner. Of the 19 wards in Meatu district, 9 were randomly selected to be included
in the study. Those 9 wards contain 48 villages, of which 12 were randomly selected
to participate in the study. Tanzanian law requires researchers to gain permission from
village leaders to conduct research in each village. The village leaders in all the original
12 villages agreed to participate. At the village level, each village officer provided a
list of every household residing in the village. These household lists were divided by
sub-village (2-8 sub-villages per village); 2 to 5 sub-villages were randomly selected from
each village for the study. Within each of the 2-5 selected sub-villages, an equal number
of households from each sub-village were randomly selected from the prepared house-
hold rosters to be included in the sample. Approximately 5 percent of the households
originally selected refused to participate and were replaced. Households were considered
eligible for participation in the study if they contained a married woman age 13 to 40
and the woman’s husband also was living in the household.9
The Meatu household survey was implemented in August-November 2012, before
the family planning program began, and again starting in July 2014, after the program
ended. Due to attrition and migration, the second round of the household survey was not
completed until February 2015. This household survey includes separate questionnaires
for men and women, both of which include modules on socioeconomic status, health and
family planning, spousal relations and agriculture. An average of 55 households were
interviewed in each of the 12 study villages (60 households from ten of the villages; 30
9If more than one wife was living in the household, the field staff interviewed the oldest wife who
was still under 40 years old. This occurred in approximately 10 percent of households. If multiple pairs
of spouses were living in the household and eligible, the couple which included the head of household
was interviewed. This occurred in approximately 5 percent of households
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households from two villages).
The family planning education program was cluster-randomized at the village level
and treatment assignment was stratified along village-level baseline contraceptive use.
The family planning program began with a reproductive health training for the com-
munity based distributors, provided by the Ministry of Health.10 Three literate women
from each of the eight treatment villages were selected to participate in the training at
the district capital, Mwanhuzi, in February 2013. These 24 women then returned to
their own villages, where they began work as “community-based distributors” (CBDs),
consulting with households about family planning and working with the local dispensary.
Each CBD was paid monthly for visiting households in her village to share the
information from the training and to discuss family planning options. During household
visits, CBDs were trained to greet all family members first, and then to ensure a private
discussion (either for wives or for husbands and wives together). The consultations
included a discussion of the benefits of birth spacing, questions to gauge interest in
family planning, review of the long-term and short-term methods available and the fact
that they are available free of charge, and information about the process of acquiring
contraceptives. Because exactly three CBDs per village were selected for the work and
paid to visit at least forty households per month, the number of CBD visits per household
varies with village size. In general, smaller villages were treated more intensively, with a
larger number of household visits, over the fourteen-month intervention. In most cases,
the entire village was treated with the CBD visits. But in three of the larger villages
(Villages 3, 10 and 11), one to two sub-villages were dropped from the treatment to
reduce the amount of work required by the CBDs.11 The treatment intensity varies
from a household visit once every two weeks (mostly in the smaller villages) to a few
visits per year. Seventy-three percent of households who were visited by a CBD had
10The training curriculum originated from a UNICEF handbook on family planning and child health.
The teachers at the training were employed by the district hospital as public health educators, special-
izing in sexual and reproductive health.
11The dropped sub-villages were chosen based on two criteria: 1) They were not part of the random
sample of sub-villages during the baseline and 2) They were not where the CBD lived. The CBDs were
slightly more likely to live in sub-villages close to the village center. The sub-villages close to village
center have more off-farm work opportunities, thus some bias in the sample selection may have been
induced.
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at least four visits per year (which could mean up to six visits over the course of the
intervention given the 4 month duration of the follow-up household survey).12
To explore asymmetric information in fertility decisions over the course of the fifteen-
month intervention, the treatment villages were split from the outset into two arms. In
one treatment group (four villages), the CBDs consulted with the woman alone (indi-
vidual treatment group), and in the other four villages, the distributors consulted with
the couple together (couples treatment group). This split treatment approach allows
one to measure the effect of asymmetric information in household decision-making; hus-
bands in the first treatment group did not receive the information about methods and
availability of family planning. Households in the four control villages received no con-
sultations. The second research question, about whether to include husbands, will be
tested by comparing the two treatment arms. The individual treatment group meets
the criteria for the non-cooperative game defined above because the treatment design
excludes husbands from information about the availability of contraceptives. The ex-
clusion of the husband reduces his ability to explicitly prohibit contraceptive use, thus
allowing her to choose between C = 1 and C = 0. The two testable hypotheses under
this question (if the husband is expected [not] to be abusive, is she less [more] likely to
take contraceptives?) will be explored in measuring the effect of the individual treat-
ment. The geographical dispersion of households in the individual treatment, couples
treatment and control group can be viewed in Figure 2.2. Each blue dot represents
a household in the individual treatment, each black dot represents a household in the
couples treatment and each red dot represents a control household.
In many cases, opposition from husbands, parents-in-law or from the women them-
selves prevented the intervention from being fully implemented. Although CBDs were
encouraged to visit every household within their assigned sub-villages or village, if there
was a conflict or opposition to their visit to a given household, they would not continue
to pursue consultations with that household. The CBDs in each village estimated the
approximate percentage of households who turned away the visits, and this estimate
12The household survey data do not include information on which CBDs visited each home. And
due to the decentralized implementation, it is also possible that any woman or couple was visited by
multiple CBDs. For these reasons, in the analysis, it is not possible to control for which CBD visited
each woman.
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ranged from one in four households (Villages 3, 4 and 10) to one in twenty households
(Village 2). Despite the fact that the CBDs reported that they visited almost all house-
holds, 36 percent of households assigned to the treatment group reported that they did
not have any CBD visits. This effect is not substantially different across treatment
arms: 32 percent of couples treatment households did not report visits, and 40 percent
of individual treatment households did not have visits. The households who turn away
the CBD visits can be classified as non-compliers (did not take up the treatment, de-
spite assignment). Compliance varies starkly across villages. In Village 2, 94 percent of
households were visited by a CBD. However, in Village 10, where the CBDs were unable
to complete assigned work, only 23 percent of households were visited by a CBD.13
The map also displays the distribution of village health dispensaries (similar to small
clinics with pharmacies). Most women (75 percent) who use contraceptives report that
they heard about their current method at the dispensary. As can be seen in Figure
2, many villages have their own dispensary, although in some cases, several villages
share a dispensary or clinic (with dispensary). Figure 2 distinguishes between control
dispensaries and treatment dispensaries. Each village reported the dispensary that
villagers would attend for contraception. If that dispensary was also frequented by
women who were assigned to the treatment (receiving CBD visits), that dispensary is
characterized as a “treatment dispensary.” (8 of the total 10 dispensaries).
It is important to note that all forms of contraception in Tanzanian public dispen-
saries are offered to women free of charge. In the baseline focus group discussions, most
women reported that they did not know that contraceptives were free.
The empirical analysis in the study exploits the random assignment of individuals
to the two treatment groups or to the control group to directly measure the treatment
effect. Selection bias of the estimate of the impact of the program is reduced by the
fact that individuals did not self-select into village treatment assignment.
13In Village 10, all three CBDs gave birth during the course of the intervention. One CBD gave
birth to triplets and was not able to perform most of her work duties to visit households in her village.
Another CBD was married to the Village Executive Officer, who was accused of corruption during
the intervention. She was reluctant to visit households in her village during the public accusation.
Village 10 is also the largest and most populated village in the study sample (400 households across five
sub-villages).
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
I first estimate the effect of the offer of the program on the study population. This
estimation, known as the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect, measures the effect of being in a
treatment village on contraceptive use and pregnancy. It does not distinguish between
those who complied with the treatment assignment (living in a treatment village and
participating in CBD consultations) and those who did not comply (living in a treatment
village but not participating in consultations). Thus it is an average effect for these two
groups.
The ITT estimation uses dichotomous outcome variables, so I use a linear probability
model (LPM) to estimate the following multivariate regression: 14
yi = β0 + βTTi +X
′
iβ + i (2.4.1)
where yi represents usage of contraceptives or pregnancy for individual i, Ti is an in-
dicator variable for whether a household was offered the treatment,15 Xi is a vector of
household and individual control variables,16 and i captures all unobservable individual
or household factors that may influence the outcome variable, yi. If no individuals in
the control group participated in the treatment then the estimate of β from this regres-
sion is a consistent and unbiased estimate of ITT (impact of offering the treatment).
For the impact of Ti to be causal on yi, all (unobservable) factors that are not in X
(and thus are in the error term ), must not be correlated with treatment, Ti. In other
words, it must be that E[T] = 0. Because the assignment to treatment in this study
was done through a random number generator that is not based on village or household
14Although LPM may produce predicted values outside of [0,1], I use this estimation strategy because
it does not impose a functional form on the error term. Moreover, I do not make forecasts on the outcome
variables.
15This ITT estimation is also performed with dosage (number of CBDs/village population) as the
treatment variable.
16The control variables include the following baseline data: wife’s age, wife’s age squared, female
off-farm labor, male off-farm labor, wife is over the age of 40, contraceptive use in 2012, husband has
been abusive, number of children born, number of children born squared, wife has completed primary
school, standardized agricultural income, village population size, husband’s desired fertility, wife dislikes
family planning, husband wants at least 2 more children than wife, village-level stratification, distance
to dispensary, wife wants no more children.
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characteristics, the estimate of βT is an unbiased estimate of the impact of Ti.
Although villages were randomly assigned to treatment, it is possible that women
who complied with participating in the treatment (consulted with the CBD) were differ-
ent in some unobservable way from those assigned to treatment who did not comply.17
The varying levels of treatment compliance across villages (from 23 percent in Village
10 to 94 percent in Village 2) make the local average treatment effect (LATE) an ap-
propriate parameter for treatment impact estimation.18 The LATE parameter estimate
measures the treatment effect specifically for those who chose to comply with the treat-
ment, that is, those for whom the offer of the treatment persuaded them to obtain the
treatment (and who would not choose the treatment if it were not offered). In this case,
this means that the estimated treatment effect pertains to a sample of couples that are
more likely to invite the CBD into their home.
To estimate the LATE, I measure the effect of P (actual participation in the treat-
ment), instrumented with assignment to treatment (T ), using the following first stage
equation:
Pi = β0 + βTTi +X
′
iβ + ui (2.4.2)
The instruments, in the vector Ti, include village treatment assignment and village level
dosage of CBD treatment (3 CBDs/village population) to represent the varying level of
household visits as a function of village population. I then use the predicted values of
the treatment, Pi, to estimate the effect on contraceptive use in the following second
stage equation:
yi = β0 + βP Pˆi +X
′
iβ + i (2.4.3)
17For example, these could may contain husbands who are more willing to let a visitor speak privately
to his wife about women’s health.
18In essence, average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and LATE require the same regressions.
ATT includes a stronger set of assumptions and requires that the control group was not treated. In
this case, 4.5 percent of the control group was treated, so the measurement is LATE. This spillover
of treatment from the villages assigned to treatment to villages assigned to control may be due to
CBDs wanting to share family planning information with couples in control villages or discrepancies
over borders between treatment and control villages.
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For this analysis to provide a causal and unbiased estimate of the effect of the treatment
on the compliers (i.e. LATE), several assumptions must hold. First, the instruments, Ti
must have relevant explanatory power for Pi. In other words, Cov[Ti, Pi] 6= 0. This can
be tested by examining the combined significance of the instruments in the first stage
equation. Second, the instrument must be exogenous to the second stage equation.
In other words, E[T ′iui] = 0. Using the randomly implemented treatment variable
(village treatment assignment) as an instrument for having actually been visited by a
CBD is the key to the LATE estimation strategy. Treatment dosage (3 CBDs/ village
population) is exogenous to the key intervention outcome, yi, contraceptive use, as
village population size was set prior to the intervention and is not related to village-
level random assignment.
Next, I attempt to increase the precision of the estimate of the treatment effect by
using Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimation. This econometric method accounts
for any time-invariant unobservable baseline differences. I measure the DID treatment
effect by estimating the following regression:
yit = β0 + β1Tit+ β2Ti + β3t+X
′
itβ + i (2.4.4)
where i represents individuals, Ti is an indicator variable for the treatment group, t is an
indicator variable for the follow-up time period (2014) and  represents any other time-
variant unobservable characteristics that may affect the outcome yit (current pregnancy
or current use of any type of contraceptives). In this case, β1 captures the treatment
effect because it is the coefficient of the interaction of both time and treatment. I
also combine the DID method with LATE, instrumenting the interaction variable with
treatment assignment, dosage and time. This gives an estimate that accounts for time
trends, uses both baseline and endline data, and measures the effect of the treatment
for those who were induced to participate in the consultations by treatment assignment.
Finally, to explore the effect of violence with the treatment effect on fertility out-
comes, I estimate a triple difference regression. I expand on 2.4.4, the double difference,
by also including a dummy variable, Vi, for whether household i was abusive at baseline
(2012). Using this strategy, I estimate the following regression:
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yit = β0 + β1Tit+ β2Ti + β3t+ β4Vi + β5ViTi + β6Vit+ β7TitVi +X
′
itβ + i (2.4.5)
In this triple differences estimation, β1 + β7 represents the total treatment effect for
women with abusive husbands, while β1 by itself is the effect for women whose husbands
are not abusive. Throughout the results, standard error estimates in this analysis are
clustered at the village level. And due to the small number of clusters (12 villages),
I employ the wild cluster bootstrap technique to adjust for potential over-rejection
(Cameron and Miller, 2015).
2.5 Descriptive Statistics
The Meatu District, in rural Shinyanga region, is poor even by Tanzanian standards.
Almost every home has dirt floors (98 percent) and only 1 percent have public electricity
in the dwelling. Descriptive socioeconomic statistics across the control group, individual
treatment group and couples treatment group are shown in Table 2.1. It is rare for
women to work for pay outside of the family farm. In this analysis, I define “off-farm
work” for both men and women as having employment or income outside of working
within the family home or farm. Selling goods at a market or in the village, working
as hired labor and teaching primary school are all examples of off-farm work in Meatu
villages. Perhaps surprisingly, most households do not identify as religious, although
they may still maintain traditional animist beliefs. As another sign of poverty, the
majority of households in the study (77 percent) use unprotected improvised wells as
a source of drinking water. This is the least sanitary option in this region because
livestock and wild animals can drink from and defecate in these water sources.
T-tests were performed across the three groups to measure statistical difference
across the three groups. For most variables, the difference in means is not significant;
however, the difference for husbands’ desired number of additional children is significant.
The average number of children born per woman across all groups (around 5) is high
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and the local rate of child mortality (around 14 percent of children born) is also very
high. A high infant mortality rate is evidence that parents may view child rearing
as a risky investment and want greater numbers of children to compensate for the
high risk of child death. This table also shows the difference between women’s desired
number of additional children, her perception of her husband’s desire for additional
children, and his actual desired number of children. The average difference between the
number of additional children desired by a wife and her husband is 2.5 children. The
wife’s perception of her husband’s desired number of additional children is, on average,
larger than her desired number of additional children and much smaller than his desired
number of additional children. While it is clear that women want fewer children than
their husbands, and that they are not able to estimate their partners desires, they appear
to know to some degree that their husbands prefer larger families.
Intimate partner violence is unfortunately common among this population (36 per-
cent on average) and is likely underreported. Women’s off-farm employment and hus-
bands’ alcohol consumption are both positively correlated with physical abuse. The
2012 levels of violence indicate her expectations on the probability that he will inflict
violence in attempt to induce her to not take contraceptives. This is represented by the
probability of punishment, pi in the model; I will measure how the effect of the family
planning program changes based on previous level of violence.
2.6 Results and Discussion
2.6.1 Attrition
A number of households could not be traced for the follow-up household interview,
either because they refused to participate or due to migration. The rate of attrition in
this experiment is 16 percent in the women’s survey and 21 percent in the men’s survey.
In cases of spousal separation, interviewing the woman was prioritized for the second
round of the household survey. The rate of attrition varies across villages. Villages 11,
5 and 6 had the highest men’s attrition rates at 23 percent. Village 1 and 8 had the
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lowest attrition men’s rates at 8 percent. The final sample size is 559 households.
Attrition did not occur randomly on observable characteristics. The 2012 rate of
contraceptive use among those who did not attrit is 13 percent, while the rate of con-
traceptive use for the attritted households is 9 percent, although this difference is not
statistically significant. Attrition levels vary slightly by treatment status: 16 percent
attrition in the control group, 16 percent in the individual treatment group and 13
percent in the couples treatment group (differences not statistically significant). How-
ever, the attritted households were on average further from dispensaries (by 0.06 km,
t = 1.58), contained women who were less educated (7.4 percent less primary comple-
tion, t = 2.01) and were slightly less likely to have women working off the farm (by 6.6
percent, t = 0.26). This slightly different attrition patterns by treatment groups make
it impossible to completely rule out observable and unobservable differences between
treatment and control households; yet, the estimate of the impact of the treatment on
fertility behavior is unlikely to suffer from substantial bias due to differential attrition.
2.6.2 Longitudinal Changes in Family Planning
Changes in contraceptive use pre- and post-intervention can be seen in Table 2.2. Across
all groups, I show the levels of contraceptive use in 2012, the change in current use of
contraceptives, changes in pregnancy rates and changes in men’s fertility preferences.
The percent of woman who are pregnant dropped over the course of the treatment
and this drop is larger in the treatment groups. However the increase in the use of
contraception is spread across all groups. The percent of women who were using contra-
ception in 2012, before the intervention in the control, individual and couples treatment
groups were 14 percent, 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively. This percentage in-
creased in 2014 to 29 percent, 19 percent and 22 percent, respectively. While this shows
a clear increase in the usage of contraceptives, this increase is surprisingly present in the
control group as well as in the treatment groups. I discuss possible explanations for this
increase in reported contraceptive use in the next section. The household survey data
from 2012 provide insights into the main drivers of contraceptive use. Formal education,
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work status (having an off-farm income) and a larger number of living children increase
the likelihood that a woman had ever used contraceptives in 2012.
A second type of data was collected over the course of the intervention to gain insight
into the fluctuations in village-level contraceptive use during process of bargaining over
fertility (Figure 2.3). The community-based distributors (CBDs) collected monthly data
as they visited each household, thus the observations include only the two treatment
groups. The intervention data were recorded for 40 of the households that the CBD
visited each month. In many cases, the data were from a different set of 40 households
each month (e.g., January was sub-village 1, February was sub-village 2). As a result,
the fluctuations observed in Figure 1 are mostly a result of the heterogeneous sampling
of observations each month. However, contraception adoption and subsequent abandon-
ment are also common over the course of women’s fertility life course. Both the couples
and individual treatment groups appear to be increasing their use of contraceptives,
although at differing rates.
2.6.3 Estimation of Treatment Impact
In this section, I first explore the effect of the program’s possible reduction in the
psychosocial cost of contraceptives and the impact it has on fertility behavior. This
exploration involves measuring the average effect of both treatment groups. I then
measure the effect of the individual and couples treatment groups separately, to better
understand the effect of the inclusion of husbands in consultations about family plan-
ning. And finally, I measure heterogeneity of the treatment effects by differences in
expectations about the husband’s behavior change the treatment effects.
Psychosocial Cost of Contraceptives
I begin by exploring the treatment effect on fertility behavior, which would suggest
a reduction in the psycho-social cost of contraceptives through the family planning
program. Table 2.3 shows the negative effects of any treatment (including both couples
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and individual treatments) on pregnancies. For the entire study population, Column (1)
shows that pregnancies decreased by an average of 6.4 percentage points, and this effect
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In column (2) of Table 2.3, I measure
the intent to treat effect by estimating the effect of an individual being assigned to the
individual or couples treatment group on contraceptive use.19 The ITT is negative but
not statistically significant. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.4 show the estimation results
for the sub-population of individuals that chose to comply with treatment assignment,
or the LATE. Column (3) shows that the instruments (village treatment assignment
and dosage (a function of village size)) are significant predictors of whether a household
was treated (any type of treatment) (F-statistic=76.3). In column (4), the predicted
values of the treatment, Pˆi are used to estimate the local average treatment effect
on pregnancies. However, despite the more precise measurement of the effect of the
treatment on the subpopulation of compliers, the coefficient in column (4) of Table
2.3 is still negative and not statistically significant. Under the difference-in-difference
estimation strategy, which is a more precise measure of ITT using OLS, the effect of
the combined treatment (as an interaction between treatment village and time) is also
negative and not statistically significant. Finally, the local average treatment effect,
using difference-in-differences estimation, is negative and statistically significant at a 10
percent level. Using the LATE instruments and the interaction of time and treatment,
women in the treatment group are 14.3 percentage points less likely to be pregnant in
2014. This table provides support for the program’s impact on the reduction of excess
pregnancies.
Table 2.4 gives results confirm that much of the descriptive observations in Table
2.2, there has been a population-wide increase in reported contraceptive use. In Column
(1), the effect of time on uptake of contraception is large and significant. Because the
control group increased their use of reported contraceptive use more than the treatment
groups, the intent-to-treat effect in column (2) is negative (although not statistically
significant). Column (4) and (5) demonstrates the negative effects using LATE and DID.
In the DID specification, women in the treatment group are 8.3 percentage points less
19I also measure the ITT effect of dosage (number of CBDs/village population) on contraceptive use
and pregnancies. These results are similar to the estimation of the impact of treatment assignment,
negative and not statistically significant.
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likely to report contraceptive use at endline and this effect is statistically significant at
the 10 percent level. This table demonstrates negative effect of any treatment (couples
and individual treatment) on reported contraceptive use.
How is it possible that reported contraceptive use increased in all groups yet preg-
nancies dropped only in the treatment group? One possible explanation is a bias in
self-reported contraceptive use. The process of enumeration about family planning and
the larger focus on improving maternal health in the district could influence respon-
dents’ reported answers about contraceptive use and pressure respondents to indicate
that they are using contraceptives when they are not. In other words, responses may
be subject to desirability bias. Pregnancy, on the other hand, is less likely to be biased
and is more easily observed.20 A second explanation is that the substantial reduction in
pregnancies in the treatment groups, amid reported increases in contraceptive use in the
entire study sample, provides evidence of a possible lagged dispersion of contraceptive
behavior from the treatment group to the control group. It is possible that the women in
the control group have just began use of contraceptives, are not using the contraceptive
methods properly, or are using them inconsistently. If this theory were true, we would
expect to see a reduction in pregnancies in the control group in a later time period. The
reduction in pregnancies as a result of treatment is in line with the predictions of the
conceptual framework. A decrease in the psychosocial cost of adopting contraceptives
(cc) was predicted to increase use of contraceptives and reduce pregnancies. Improve-
ments in knowledge, reduction in social stigma, and an increased public dialogue around
family planning all decreased the psychosocial cost of family planning.
Effect of Including Husbands on Fertility Decisions
The second research question relates to the effectiveness of including husbands in family
planning consultations. Table 2.5 shows the results of separated individual and couples
treatment effects on pregnancies and demonstrates that, across all specifications, the
individual treatment effect is negative. In the LATE+DID specification, women assigned
20If anything, pregnancies are likely under-reported as many women are not confident of pregnancies
in the first trimester and may experience miscarriages after reporting pregnancies.
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to the individual treatment decreased their pregnancies by 16.5 percentage points; this
effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Although the couples treatment
appears also to have a negative effect, it is never statistically significant. Table 2.6 shows
the results of separated individual and couples treatment effects on contraceptive use.
The effect of the couples treatment on reported use is mixed. Under single difference ITT
and single difference LATE, the effect of the couples treatment on contraceptive use is
negative. However, the effect of the couples treatment is positive under double difference
ITT and double difference LATE. Yet, it is not statistically significant under any of these
specifications. The effect of the individual treatment on reported contraceptive use is
consistently negative across specifications. The estimated local average treatment effect
(LATE) for women in the individual treatment is an 18.2 percentage point reduction in
reported contraceptive use (statistically significant at the 5 percent level).
The validity of reported contraceptive use data is again called into question given the
negative effect of the individual treatment on pregnancies. Pregnancies are likely less
subject to reporting bias than contraceptive use. The individual group also received
consultations about family planning without their husbands’ involvement and poten-
tially without their husbands’ approval, so in the case of covert use of contraceptives,
these women may be less willing to report contraceptive use to strangers, including
enumerators.21 The statistically significant negative effect of the individual treatment
on pregnancies suggests that family planning consultations are more effective without
husbands’ involvement. However, if we examine the effect of the couples treatment on
husbands’ fertility desires, relative to the individual group and the control group, Ta-
ble 2.8 demonstrates that the involvement of husbands had a negative but insignificant
effect. It is possible that while excluding husbands may lead to fewer births, including
husbands may reduce their highly influential fertility desires.
In addition to the quantitative household and intervention data, I also collected
qualitative data through focus group discussions in both 2012 and 2014. The most in-
triguing of these discussions was with the family planning community-based distributors
(CBDs) after the intervention was complete. These women had essentially facilitated
21This is possible even though the enumerator interviews for the household survey take place in
private.
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family planning learning and experienced bargaining over fertility within their own
villages. Both CBDs who implemented the individual treatment and those that imple-
mented the couples treatment insisted that including husbands in the consultations is
much more effective for education. According to one distributor: “If both husband and
wife are involved in the CBD meeting, then the start of the conversation is even and
men don’t have all the power. They will continue to discuss family planning together
and it is easy for them to reference what they learned from the CBD.” This observa-
tion supports reproductive health policies that build on the couples intervention and
intentionally include husbands in conversations about family planning.
The second research question also brings up two testable hypotheses. Whether to
include husbands in family planning conversations depends on expectations of violence
in the household. The individual treatment allows women covert information about
contraceptives. While they appear to reduce births as a result of the treatment, how does
this effect change as a result of husbands’ abusive behavior? These testable hypotheses
from the conceptual framework are: (2a) When women do not expect husbands to
be abusive (pi = 0), they would be more likely to adopt contraceptives and reduce
pregnancies and (2b) when women do expect abuse from husbands (pi = 1), women
would be less likely to adopt contraceptives and reduce pregnancies.
This test involves estimating the effect of the individual treatment group on key
outcomes. When a husband is not involved in family planning consultations, his ability
to explicitly prohibit contraceptive use is limited. Here, I interact baseline spousal
violence with treatment status and time to observe how violence expectations change
the effect of the treatment. The results are shown in Table 2.7. The interaction effect of
the individual treatment, post and violence is negative and statistically significant at the
5 percent level. This indicates that the total treatment effect on pregnancies that was
observed in column (4) of Table 2.5 is primarily driven by women with abusive husbands
taking advantage of the family planning information and reducing pregnancies. When
women expect husbands to be violent, (pi = 1), they are actually more likely to privately
adopt contraceptives and reduce births. This effect is statistically significant at the 5
percent level. These results contradict the predictions from the conceptual framework.
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Table 2.8 shows the effect of the individual and couples treatments on husbands’
fertility desires again using a triple difference. In column (1), the couples treatment
reduces husbands’ fertility preferences, though not in a statistically significant way.
In column (2), the individual treatment is also shown to increase husbands’ fertility
preferences, though again, not in a statistically significant way. This indicates that
the joint educational conversations with the CBD may have changed the husbands’
demand for children. Column (3) shows that the individual treatment had a statistically
significant effect in reducing the number of spousal discussions about family size. The
effect of the couples treatment is positive on discussions about family size, but not
statistically significant. The individual treatment may reduce unwanted pregnancies
significantly and this is likely to improve private welfare for the wives (who have smaller
fertility desires). This strategic behavior is consistent with the non-cooperative model.
Yet, the reduction in the husbands’ fertility preferences may change the household model
away from strategic behavior and individual best responses towards one of cooperation.
This is evidence of an ongoing trade-off between individual welfare gains and cooperative
value in marriage.
There are clear policy implications of the above dual treatment effects. The two
ways of providing family planning information need not be exclusive. In cases of starkly
heterogeneous fertility preferences and low intra-couple bargaining power for women,
educational consultations should be joint and provided at the household level. However,
a simultaneous informational distribution program about cost and access held privately
for women would meet their immediate demand for contraceptives. A dual program,
providing both joint education and individual information, would potentially both align
preferences for cooperation in the long run and reduce excess fertility in the short run.
2.7 Conclusion
The experiment described in this paper provides evidence of the positive effect of a
community education program in reducing unwanted births in an area of high fertility.
The process of training community-based distributors (CBDs) and employing them to
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visit households and discuss contraceptive options, reduced the psycho-social cost of
fertility control for women and resulted in fewer pregnancies. The effect of the program
is nuanced, though, in the relationship between reported contraceptive use and reduced
pregnancies. Over the two-year study time period, reported contraceptive use increased
substantially across both treatment groups and the control group. However, the family
planning program reduced pregnancies in the in the treatment group by 14.3 compared
to the control group, a difference that is statistically significant.
The decrease in treatment group pregnancies combined with a study-wide reported
increase in contraceptive use allows for several potential explanations. First, reported
contraceptive use is subject to bias. In the individual treatment group, women reduced
pregnancies by 16.5 percentage points despite an insignificant effect on contraceptive use.
However, pregnancies are less subject to reporting bias, thus the reduction in pregnancies
in the individual treatment is more credible than the insignificant effect on contraceptive
use. This group of women received the family planning consultations without their
husbands’ participation, which allows for concealed adoption of contraceptives. Given
the potential for concealed use under asymmetric information, these women may be less
willing to report their contraceptive use, both to their husbands and to enumerators.
Additionally, given the lack of reduction in pregnancies in the control group and the
reported increase in contraceptive use, it is possible that contraceptive use is being
over-reported for this group. During the process of survey interviews at baseline and
endline, respondents may have felt pressure to report the use of contraceptives, even
when they were not. Enumeration does not exist within a vacuum and it is entirely
possible that the presence of a research project may influence survey responses in a
way entirely distinct from the intervention. A second potential explanation is a lagged
dispersion of contraceptive behavior from the treatment group to the control group.
Households who were visited by a CBD over the course of the treatment may have been
able to share this information with neighboring villages, and the effect of the treatment
spilled over to non-treated households. At the time of endline enumeration, women in
the control group may have just begun using contraceptives, or may not yet be using
them properly or consistently.
The solution to whether husbands should be involved in consultations about family
35
planning depends on policy objectives and preferences. Women who consulted with
the family planning workers individually (without their husbands) had a larger reduc-
tion in pregnancies than those who consulted together with their husbands. However,
the involvement of husbands in these discussions had the effect of reducing husbands’
fertility preferences. These fertility desires are very influential on high fertility rates
(Ezeh, 1993). The reduction in fertility desires was small and not significant for the
entire population, but much larger and significant when interacted with the presence of
abuse. In a region of the world where women have limited bargaining power within the
household, private information about contraceptives can afford women fertility control
and improved welfare. Meanwhile, joint consultations with an informed family planning
worker may improve cooperation through aligning preferences for children. The non-
cooperative model predicts that, given the opportunity, women will take advantage of
private information and delay births. The model prediction that, when women expect
abuse from their husbands, they will be less likely to adopt contraception is rejected by
the the empirical evidence. In fact women with abusive husbands who receive private
information about family planning are more likely to adopt contraceptives and reduce
fertility.
This paper contributes to the literature by bridging the microeconomics literature
on asymmetric information and strategic behavior among spouses (Ashraf, Field, and
Lee, 2014; Castilla and Walker, 2013) and the demography literature on spousal com-
munication and education as vehicle for family planning (Ezeh, Seroussi, and Raggers,
1996; Lasee and Becker, 1997). The long intervention allows for intra-household bargain-
ing over fertility. In the unresolved question on whether husbands should be included
in family planning education, my results provide evidence of the positive cooperation
effects of inclusion while also supporting private welfare gains for women in individ-
ual consultations. Further research on the balance of husbands’ and wives’ preferences
during the bargaining process would lead to a better comparison of these trade-offs.
This randomized field experiment is small in scale: the intervention included 24
family planning workers across eight villages in one district in Tanzania. After at-
trition, the sample included two treatment groups and a control group of about 150
households each. Yet, the study provides substantial support for the effectiveness of
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community-based distribution of family planning services in reducing excess fertility.
The trade-off between improved fertility control for women on one hand, and improved
communication and aligned preferences on the other, supports policy interventions that
include both joint and individual informational sessions. The inclusion of husbands in
education-focused consultations may reduce husbands’ fertility preferences, and the ex-
clusion of husbands in information and access-based consultations may allow women to
meet immediate demand for fertility control. In areas of the developing world with high
fertility rates and starkly different spousal fertility preferences, community-based dis-
tribution of family planning information plays an important role in reducing unwanted
pregnancies.
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.2: Treatment and Control Households in
Meatu District
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Figure 2.3: Dynamic Contraceptive Use by Treatment
Type
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics and Balance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Control Indiv. Treat. Couples Treat. P-value
Wife has off-farm income 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.78
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Not religious 0.70 0.60 0.72 0.79
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Distance to dispensary (km) 0.77 0.66 0.37 0.08*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Unprotected well for water 0.96 0.73 0.63 0.14
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Number of bikes in hh 1.30 1.28 1.27 0.54
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Rainy season ag income (USD) 833.85 549.39 857.91 0.91
(74.53) (38.99) (55.07)
Number cattle owned 18.49 9.18 24.78 0.98
(2.37) (0.99) (7.60)
Number children born per woman 5.18 5.46 5.13 0.22
(0.24) (0.23) (0.27)
Num. children died per woman 0.74 0.77 0.65 0.56
(0.12) (0.08) (0.09)
Wife desired num. add’l children 1.68 1.43 1.30 0.16
(0.20) (0.16) (0.15)
Wife’s view of husb. desired num add’l chrn 2.38 1.72 1.17 0.08*
(0.25) (0.18) (0.15)
Husband’s desired add’l children 4.42 3.27 3.59 0.42
(0.41) (0.29) (0.29)
Husband has ever been abusive towards wife 0.40 0.40 0.35 0.12
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Wife has hidden contraception from husb. 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.32
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Wife has completed primary school 0.90 0.83 0.92 0.44
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 146 157 144
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses using Cameron and Miller (2015)
bootstrapping for a small number of clusters.
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Table 2.2: Longitudinal Changes in Family Planning
2012 2014
VARIABLES Ctrl. Indiv. Treat. Coup. Treat. Ctrl. Indiv. Treat. Coup. Treat.
Woman is using any type contraception 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.29 0.19 0.22
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Wife currently is pregnant 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.16
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Wife ever used family planning in 2012 0.19 0.18 0.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Husb desired add’l children, 2012 4.99 3.73 3.80 3.08 2.71 2.76
(0.40) (0.28) (0.27) (0.30) (0.22) (0.26)
Observations 177 195 183 163 186 165
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 2.3: Any Treatments: Effect on Pregnancies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Single difference Single diff. Single diff. Single diff. Double diff. Double diff.
VARIABLES Time Effect ITT 1st stage LATE ITT LATE
Post -0.064*** -0.030 -0.016
(0.023) (0.066) (0.047)
Assigned to treatment -0.019 0.439** 0.040
(0.029) (0.189) (0.059)
Dosage of CBDs in vill. 13.724**
(5.892)
Participated in treatment -0.015 0.120**
(0.043) (0.054)
Treatment village*Post -0.074
(0.078)
Participated*Post -0.143*
(0.076)
Controls? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,066 560 560 560 1,066 1,066
R-squared 0.007 0.062 0.332 0.052 0.068 0.065
Control variables include: wife’s age, wife’s age squared, female off-farm labor, male off-farm
labor, wife is over the age of 40, contraceptive use in 2012, husband has been abusive,
number of children born, number of children, born squared, wife has completed primary
school, standardized agricultural income, village population size, husband’s desired fertility,
wife dislikes family planning, husband wants at least 2 more, children than wife, number of
wives, village-level stratification, distance to dispensary, wife wants no more children.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses using Cameron and Miller (2015)
bootstrapping for small number of clusters.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 2.4: Any Treatments: Effect on Contraceptive Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single diff. Single diff. Single diff. Single diff. Double diff.
VARIABLES Time Effect ITT 1st stage LATE ITT
Post 0.095*** 0.141***
(0.023) (0.000)
Assigned to treatment -0.079 0.439** 0.010
(0.076) (0.189) (0.009)
Dosage of CBDs in vill. 13.724**
(5.892)
Participated in treatment -0.119
(0.082)
Treatment village*Post -0.083*
(0.047)
Controls? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,066 560 560 560 1,066
R-squared 0.015 0.180 0.332 0.160 0.362
Control variables include: wife’s age, wife’s age squared, female off-farm labor, male off-farm
labor, wife is over the age of 40, contraceptive use in 2012, husband has been abusive,
number of children born, number of children, born squared, wife has completed primary
school, standardized agricultural income, village population size, husband’s desired fertility,
wife dislikes family planning, husband wants at least 2 more, children than wife, number of
wives, village-level stratification, distance to dispensary, wife wants no more children.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses using Cameron and Miller (2015)
bootstrapping for small number of clusters.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Separate Treatments: Effects on Pregnancies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single difference Single diff. Double diff. Double diff.
VARIABLES ITT LATE ITT LATE
Post -0.067 -0.019
(0.070) (0.049)
Participated in couples treatment -0.025 0.047
(0.043) (0.040)
Participated in indiv. treatment 0.001 0.121**
(0.055) (0.054)
Participated in couples * Post -0.029 -0.074
(0.056) (0.063)
Participated in indiv. * Post -0.016 -0.165**
(0.178) (0.074)
Assigned to couples treat -0.019 0.024
(0.025) (0.038)
Assigned to indiv. treat -0.018 0.003
(0.049) (0.089)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 560 1,066 1,066
R-squared 0.062 0.054 0.064 0.064
Control variables include: wife’s age, wife’s age squared, female off-farm labor, male off-farm
labor, wife is over the age of 40, contraceptive use in 2012, husband has been abusive,
number of children born, number of children, born squared, wife has completed primary
school, standardized agricultural income, village population size, husband’s desired fertility,
wife dislikes family planning, husband wants at least 2 more, children than wife, number of
wives, village-level stratification, distance to dispensary, wife wants no more children.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses using Cameron and Miller (2015)
bootstrapping for small number of clusters.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 2.6: Separate Treatments: Effects on Contraceptive Use
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single diff Single diff Double diff Double diff
VARIABLES ITT LATE ITT LATE
Post 0.092*** 0.135***
(0.000) (0.034)
Participated in couples treatment -0.040 0.030
(0.067) (0.026)
Participated in indiv. treatment -0.182** 0.047
(0.093) (0.054)
Participated in couples * Post 0.006 -0.051
(0.018) (0.048)
Participated in indiv. * Post -0.041 -0.155
(0.049) (0.124)
Assigned to couples treat -0.040 -0.018
(0.063) (0.029)
Assigned to indiv. treat -0.105 -0.031*
(0.075) (0.017)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 560 1,066 1,066
R-squared 0.184 0.165 0.360 0.358
Control variables include: wife’s age, wife’s age squared, female off-farm labor, male off-farm
labor, wife is over the age of 40, contraceptive use in 2012, husband has been abusive,
number of children born, number of children, born squared, wife has completed primary
school, standardized agricultural income, village population size, husband’s desired fertility,
wife dislikes family planning, husband wants at least 2 more, children than wife, number of
wives, village-level stratification, distance to dispensary, wife wants no more children.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses using Cameron and Miller (2015)
bootstrapping for small number of clusters.
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 2.7: Changing Treatment Effects Under Violent Behavior Expectations
Triple Difference
Pregnancies
VARIABLES Couples Individual
Violence * Post * Indiv -0.173**
(0.074)
Violence * Post * Couples 0.100
(0.106)
Post 0.020 -0.039
(0.032) (0.058)
Participated in couples treatment 0.018
(0.037)
Viol husb * Coup treat -0.007
(1.304e+19)
Participated in couples * Post -0.073
(0.084)
Violence * Year -0.157** -0.018
(0.068) (0.076)
Viol husb * Indiv treat 0.177
(0.127)
Participated in indiv. * Post 0.055
(0.052)
Observations 688 720
R-squared 0.062 0.063
Control variables include: wife’s age, wife’s age squared, female off-farm labor, male off-farm
labor, wife is over the age of 40, contraceptive use in 2012, husband has been abusive,
number of children born, number of children, born squared, wife has completed primary
school, standardized agricultural income, village population size, husband’s desired fertility,
wife dislikes family planning, husband wants at least 2 more, children than wife, number of
wives, village-level stratification, distance to dispensary, wife wants no more children.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses using Cameron and Miller (2015)
bootstrapping for small number of clusters. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 2.8: Effect on Husbands’ Fertility Preferences
Husband’s Fert. Prefs. Discussion
VARIABLES Couples Individual Whole Sample
Post 0.144 -1.131** 0.023
(0.256) (0.375) (0.046)
Participated in couples treatment 0.005 0.028
(0.212) (0.036)
Participated in indiv. treatment -0.234 0.125***
(0.241) (0.048)
Violence * Post * Couples -0.290 -0.052
(0.496) (0.572)
Viol husb * Coup treat -0.083 -0.911
(0.149) (1.300)
Participated in couples * Post -0.208 0.047
(0.421) (0.082)
Violence * Post * Indiv -0.147 -0.136
(0.543) (0.441)
Viol husb * Indiv treat 0.171 0.111
(0.307) (0.104)
Participated in indiv. * Post 0.939 -0.218***
(0.576) (0.081)
Observations 637 670 1,069
R-squared 0.748 0.690 0.251
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Chapter 3
Fueling Financial Literacy:
Estimating the Impact of Youth
Entrepreneurship Training
3.1 Introduction
The prevalence of high youth unemployment is a global problem. According to an In-
ternational labor Organization (ILO) study in 2013, 73.4 million youth (aged 15-24)
are affected by unemployment. Youth may experience their initial entry into the labor
market usually during adolescence, which can set the stage for adult employment. De-
velopment organizations and governments are increasingly turning to entrepreneurship
training as a strategy for reducing youth unemployment and alleviating poverty. While
there are many factors that contribute to the success of youth when they finish training
and enter the labor market, it is important to first understand whether the program
itself had an impact on youth’s ability to sustain employment or run a business. A com-
prehensive World Bank review of hundreds of youth job training program evaluations in
developing countries concluded that there is weak evidence on labor outcomes for these
youth (Betcherman et al., 2007). When positive effects of training on labor outcomes
were present, the evidence was faint or inconsistent. This essay addresses that gap in
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evidence by measuring the impact of a youth entrepreneurship program on the financial
literacy and employment knowledge of marginalized Tanzanian youth.1
Small-scale businesses are the main source of income for hundreds of millions of people in
the developing world (Dupas and Robinson, 2009). While most policy discussions about
employment, entrepreneurship and microfinance often focus on credit constraints, the
assumption around this discussion is that, subject to those constraints, entrepreneurs
are managing enterprises optimally (Karlan and Valdivia, 2011). However, most small
enterprise owners or self-employed in sub-Saharan Africa have no formal business train-
ing, entrepreneurship skills, or, in the case of marginalized youth, even a secondary
education (Attanasio, Kugler, and Meghir, 2011; Mano et al., 2012). This has led
to a growing interest among governments and development organizations in equipping
impoverished youth with the entrepreneurship knowledge, financial literacy skills, and
confidence in labor market navigation that would help secure employment or start their
own enterprise. Generally captured in the notion of ‘entrepreneurship training’, par-
ticularly for those who have not completed formal education, such programs aim to
strengthen basic literacy and numeracy, provide vocational and life skills and, in some
cases, give participants experience saving money and accessing credit, often through
group schemes.
The rise of these entrepreneurship training programs as the centerpiece of some orga-
nizations’ poverty alleviation efforts represents, to a considerable extent, a shift in the
underlying philosophy of international economic and social development efforts (Bax-
ter et al., 2014). Previous poverty reduction strategies have been viewed as the re-
sponsibility of national governments, often assisted by bilateral and multilateral aid
organizations. In sub-Saharan Africa, however, these government efforts at poverty re-
duction have not been particularly successful (Handley et al., 2009; Collier, 2007). The
premise of many of the entrepreneurship training programs, on the other hand, is that
the labor market may be successful in rewarding human capital improvements relative
to other poverty-reduction government programs that may provide assistance without
building skills (Klinger and Schu¨ndeln, 2011). In this approach, these training programs
conduct market research to teach skills demanded by local industries, but individuals
1This chapter is coauthored with Brooke L. Krause and David Chapman.
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end up bearing the responsibility for improving their own welfare. Once provided with
the knowledge and skills relevant to entering and competing in the labor market, the
presumption is that those receiving this training will secure employment in their com-
munity or start their own enterprise. While training efforts can increase the skills and
knowledge of participants, it is not yet clear if these efforts will truly enable participants
to successfully transition into the labor market.
To gain reliable insight into training program effects, the line of research assessing
and solidifying empirical evidence must be extended. The question of great interest
to many program sponsors and donors is the extent to which observed changes in an
individual’s labor market performance are due to participation in the entrepreneurship
training program. Employment status and income are frequently used as the outcomes
of interest in evaluation studies. In this context, employment is oftentimes casual,
and inconsistent, while income can be difficult to measure (Sahn and Stifel, 2000).
Employment status and income data were not collected from our sample, so we focus
our analysis on measuring the intermediary mechanisms, such as financial literacy and
employment knowledge. These confidence and ability indicators are important steps in
realizing entrepreneurial and employment success.
A common shortcoming in evaluation is the challenge of establishing a program impact
using observational data that lack a comparison group and instead assessing change over
time among program participants. A number of time-variant factors may affect youth
livelihood outcomes for reasons unrelated to the training, such as normal maturation,
the influence of friends and family, and local, regional or national events that occur out-
side the program. It is widely understood that the gold standard in assessing whether
training programs yield intended changes in participants’ behaviors, knowledge, skills,
and attitudes is a randomized control trial (RCT). There are both practical and finan-
cial reasons an RCT is difficult to implement in the context of a community-led training
program. The development program evaluated in this paper is a locally-operated pro-
gram called U-Learn, under the direction of the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
Swisscontact. As in this case, the imposition of an RCT can undermine the implemen-
tation of the local operations of the program. For example, one goal of community-led
training programs is local capacity-building and community ownership over the program
50
itself. The community is more likely to address youth unemployment without outside
intervention in the future if they are involved in the design and implementation of this
training program, including selection of youth participants.
From the perspective of an RCT, the spread of additional youth training programs into
neighboring geographic areas may be considered contamination of the control group.
However, the spread of other similar community-led programs that address youth un-
employment is seen as a positive consequence of the U-Learn program. Through local
ownership and participation, the program aims to improve community accountability for
youth employment. For these reasons, the NGO and evaluation partners saw an RCT as
not ideal, nor feasible in this context. With concerns over local ownership and manage-
ment of the entrepreneurship program, the researchers, local partners, and funder opted
for a mixed method evaluation design including primary data collection consisting of
qualitative interviews, demographic participant data and a quantitative survey without
randomization. Further, even the creation of an appropriate population of similar but
non-participating youth in a comparison group has its problems. Trainee selection in
most programs is not random; community program managers may select youth partici-
pants quite intentionally to favor either those most likely to succeed in the program or
the most marginalized. Consequently, selecting from a demographically similar group
of students misses the unobservable, and subtler, differences between participants and
non-participants.
We make two key contributions to the existing literature. First, this paper builds on
the existing methodological literature seeking rigorous empirical evaluation techniques
to establish program impact when randomization is not feasible using primary data
collected in rural Tanzania. Second, this paper provides greater insight into training
program effects by establishing the positive effect of youth training programs on learning
outcomes, such as financial literacy and employment knowledge. Knowledge of the
labor market, job-search skills, employment confidence, and financial literacy, together
comprise mediating skills and attitudes in the process towards gainful employment and
enterprise ownership for youth.
51
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the litera-
ture on training programs and evaluation methodologies in a non-randomized setting.
Section three explores the U-Learn youth entrepreneurship program in Tanzania and
primary data collection methods. Section four discusses the strategy this paper uses
for measuring program impact and the different sensitivity analyses conducted. Section
five presents the empirical results from the various methods employed. Finally, Section
six concludes by discussing the findings and policy implications.
3.2 Evidence on Youth Training Programs
While the philosophy of entrepreneurship or skills training programs is attractive to
many governments and development organizations, the extent to which such train-
ing programs actually yield the intended benefits has yet been elusive (Oosterbeek,
Van Praag, and Ijsselstein, 2010). The World Bank-sponsored review of 289 studies
from 84 countries of interventions aimed at integrating youth into the labor market
finds weak evidence in favor of positive labor market effects (Betcherman et al., 2007).
Claims of program impact were often based on faint or inconsistent evidence. Card
et al. (2011) find that while a randomized evaluation of a job-training program in the
Dominican Republic revealed no positive impact on employability, the non-randomized
evaluation methods (that did not include propensity score matching) did measure a pos-
itive impact of the program on the same outcomes. A USAID review of 54 research and
evaluation studies published between 2001 and 2012 on the topics of youth employment,
business development, school to work transition and youth entrepreneurship concludes
that these programs in developing countries have a positive impact on employment and
earnings, but also that the evaluation design of many of the studies was weak (United
States Agency for International Development, 2013). Card et al. (2011) also note that
rigorously evaluating job training programs is important to demonstrate the limitations
of such programs in addressing the labor market barriers faced by disadvantaged youth.
However, because workforce development and entrepreneurship training programs in-
clude various facets of implementation and take place across different location, trainers
and cohorts, the inclusion of rigorous evaluation methods can be challenging. Given the
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substantial amounts of funding now being directed to supporting such programs and
the challenge of their evaluation, funders need a stronger evidence base.
Two seminal papers have established propensity score matching as a valid method to
evaluate training programs. First, Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997) analyse the
possibility of devising a matching procedure for the evaluation of a prototypical job-
training program that produces impact estimates close to those of a randomized social
experiment. The authors find support for the estimation techniques that match indi-
viduals based on their propensity for participation in the training program. They also
note the importance of having a control or comparison group that participates in the
same labor market as training recipients. Dehejia and Wahba (1999) use the National
Supported Work data (U.S. based training program) to evaluate the performance of
propensity-score matching methods, including pairwise matching and caliper matching.
The authors also confirm that matching estimators succeed in closely replicating the re-
sults in earnings obtained through an experimental evaluation of the program. Dehejia
and Wahba (1999) conclude that matching approaches are, in fact, more reliable than
traditional econometric estimators.
More recent studies of job-training programs, using various methods of evaluation, have
yielded results that are less optimistic and can be difficult to interpret. McKenzie
and Woodruff (2013) review the evaluation literature on training and entrepreneurship
programs and find modest impacts of training on the survivorship of existing firms.
However, they did find stronger evidence that training programs help prospective owners
launch new businesses. In an RCT evaluation of a comprehensive business-training
program in Peru, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) find that the treatment group of trainees
had no change in profits, business revenue or employment within their small businesses
within the time period of the evaluation. This two-year program included both business
skills and strategy development for current business owners. Yet, despite the lack of
changes in major business outcomes over the study period, the authors did observe
improvements in business knowledge among trainees. One way to interpret these results
is that improvements in knowledge of business operations is not sufficient to impact
profits or employment, however, another interpretation is that the two-year time-frame
of evaluation was an insufficient period of time to measure the impact of knowledge
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improvements on business outcomes. Business knowledge and financial literacy skills
may be intermediary mechanisms on the trajectory to employment.
Training programs that target marginalized populations (women, school dropouts or
people out of the labor force) have had slightly more success. Attanasio, Kugler, and
Meghir (2011) find evidence through a randomized control trial in Colombia that sub-
sidizing vocational training for disadvantaged youth had a significant positive impact
on earnings and the probability of employment for female participants, although it cu-
riously had little impact on male participants. Field, Jayachandran, and Pande (2010)
explore the imposition of social institutions and marginalization on women of various
castes in India. They find that Hindu women who face severe social restrictions ben-
efited the most (in terms of business income) from a basic financial literacy-training
program. De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2014) specifically targeted entrepreneurial
training in Sri Lanka towards women running subsistence businesses and those out of
the labor force. Their results show that within a year of the program, women who
received a grant and training as a packaged intervention had significant improvements
in business profitability and that training was generally more effective for new business
owners.
The De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2014) type of packaged skills development pro-
gram, although extensive in its objectives, may have more success in improving the
skills and income of participants. Deshpande and Zimmerman (2010) present existing
evidence on the dual development potential of youth savings accounts, which not only
promote access to credit and savings, but can induce financial behavioral change as well.
The authors point to growth in microfinance and financial services in developing coun-
tries, but conclude that more research is needed on the role of savings accumulation,
mentoring and skills training on the lives of youth. The present study addresses this gap
in the literature by analyzing the impact that a comprehensive entrepreneurship-training
program has on financial literacy and business skills development for marginalized youth
in Tanzania.
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3.3 The U-Learn Program and Youth Characteristics
This study assesses the extent to which an entrepreneurship-training program designed
and implemented by Swisscontact, a Swiss NGO, was able to significantly increase rel-
evant knowledge, skills, and attitudes of marginalized youth in rural Tanzania. This
study draws on primary survey data collected from 434 youth who participated and
completed the nine-month U-Learn program.2 This program targets school dropouts
aged 15-26 years old by supporting youth learning, earning and saving. Components
of the program include: technical and entrepreneurship skills-training, internships, job
placement, business start-up support, linkages to financial service providers, the for-
mation of savings groups, and life skills counseling. This multi-faceted program with
formal education, practical connections and internship opportunities comprises a pack-
aged intervention approach.
This study was undertaken to assess the impact of the U-Learn program, which was lo-
cally operated in northwestern Tanzania.3 The training program is being implemented
in both rural areas, such as Nshamba, and urban areas, such as Bukoba. It includes
elements focused on knowledge, vocational skill development, and life skills and is in-
tended to lead to either employment in the labor market, self-employment or further
education. This comprehensive program targets out-of-school youth and utilizes an ap-
prenticeship model of technical and vocational training using community and business
mentors and experts. Participants develop vocational skills through participation in
relatively small learning groups (approximately 20 participants), and savings groups
that are linked with financial service institutions. Youth form these self-governed sav-
ings groups, called Mavuno saving and lending groups, where they can earn interest on
savings as well as offer micro-loans to one another.
The U-Learn youth entrepreneurship training program is nine months in duration, after
2The program did suffer from some attrition. 492 students began the program, which represents a
11.7% attrition rate. Cohort 1 had a 9.7% attrition rate, while Cohort 2 had a 13.1% attrition rate.
Because we only have endline data from those who completed the program (and those who dropped out
were likely less motivated to learn), our estimates may overstate the true impact of the program.
3More information on the Swisscontact U-Learn program can be found at
http://www.swisscontact.org/en/projects-and-countries/project-finder/p/Project/show/u-learn-
learn-earn-and-save.html.
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which a new cohort was recruited and provided with training. The first two cohorts
of youth who received this training are included in this paper. Cohort 1 was imple-
mented in eight districts and Cohort 2 in ten districts, with six districts that offered
programming to both Cohort 1 and Cohort 2 participants. It is important to note that
the determination of Cohort 2 program locations was not based on youths’ reported
success during Cohort 1 and that village leaders were not led to believe this to be the
case. Cohort 2 entered the program at the same time that Cohort 1 was completing the
program. Figure 1 shows the cohort data collection timeline.
The selection criteria for program participation was non-random and consistent across
cohorts; youth must be between 15 and 26 years of age and have not completed secondary
school. Further, youth are selected by their community leaders based on their level
of marginalization, which is determined during a one-on-one interview, and includes
information on family life, household structure, types and sources of income. After
this interview, some youth are screened out of the pool of candidates as a result of the
selection criteria and program requirements, while others simply choose not to enter the
program.
The data sample includes all training program participants. The survey was adminis-
tered orally in Swahili, as there was considerable variation in the literacy skills among
the youth. Community-based trainers involved in the program and familiar with the
youth administered the survey program participants. All youth completed the survey
as they were entering the program and then again when they finished the nine month
training period. The enumeration process took approximately two months for each co-
hort. The survey includes questions that capture demographic information, employment
skills, financial abilities, life skills, and availability of peer and adult social supports. It
also includes more subjective aspects of individual character including the participants’
values and goals, confidence in their skills and abilities, and beliefs about men’s and
women’s financial and entrepreneurial abilities. The questionnaire can be viewed in
Table 3.3.4
4One important feature of the questionnaire is that it addresses self-reported attitudes, skills and
beliefs. Relative to a skills test of savings knowledge or financial literacy, these self-reported outcomes
may be subject to social desirability bias.
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3.4 Research Framework
Evaluating social programs using observational data is challenging, at best. Observa-
tional studies usually violate the ignorable treatment assignment assumption and thus,
selection bias is assumed to be present in program participation (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). In this setting, selection bias occurs when youth self-select or are selected into a
program based on unobservable characteristics that lead them to be more likely to gain
from the program (Smith and Todd, 2001). Although the youth are all disadvantaged,
some may have unobservable characteristics, such as ambition and motivation, which
led them to participate in the program in the first cohort (as compared with those in
a subsequent cohort). The methods of ex-post program evaluation center on imputing
the missing counterfactual: the outcomes that would have occurred in the absence of
the program.
One widely used method of observational program evaluation is a comparison of the out-
comes of program participants to similar matched non-participants to impute the coun-
terfactual (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Abou-Ali et al., 2010; Todd, 2007). For a more
formal consideration of imputing the counterfactual through propensity score matching,
let us denote E(Y1|Z, τ = 1) as the average employment or financial knowledge of youth
in the first cohort (τ = 1) after they have completed the training and E(Y0|Z, τ = 0) as
the average employment and financial knowledge of youth in the Cohort 2 (τ = 0) before
they have begun the treatment both conditional on Z, a vector of individual character-
istics. The subscript on Y, the employment or financial knowledge outcomes, denotes
the element of time (either before or after the program). We can define the treatment
effect on the treated (ATT) as a mean difference: E(y1|Z, τ = 1) − E(yˆ0|Z, τ = 0). In
estimating the program’s impact, the dilemma of not observing post-program outcomes
of Cohort 1 had they not completed the program (the counterfactual) is resolved by ex-
amining the average outcomes of the a proper comparison group of youth from Cohort
2, before they began the training.
Propensity score matching offers a way to test for this potentially causal relationship:
conditional on observed characteristics of the youth (Z), the program has an impact
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on employment and financial skill outcomes. Using the imputed comparison group,
propensity score analysis matches youth who have participated in the program with
youth who are just entering the program to compare their learning, attitude, and sav-
ing outcomes. Previous research has noted that matching methods do nothing to correct
for unobserved differences between treated and untreated observations (Hirano, Imbens,
and Ridder, 2003; Smith and Todd, 2001). Despite this, there are some advantages of
matching over ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis (Berk, 2004; Glewwe
and Todd, 2015; Ravallion, 2007). First, the treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can
be calculated without specifying a functional form of the effect, through a conditional
mean, as opposed to a linear or quadratic relationship. Secondly, the performance of
the ATT estimate is improved by imposing the condition of common support, avoiding
forced and potentially bad matches. Lastly, matching youth based on observable char-
acteristics emulates a random experiment to some degree by aligning the distribution
of the observable characteristics in both the matched comparison and treatment groups
(Glewwe and Todd, 2015).
Since participant selections were not random and no contemporaneous control group
was available, this study uses propensity score analysis to address selection bias. We
employ cross-sectional matching using a set of 36 observed characteristics, Z, under
the assumption that outcomes are independent of program participation conditional
on these observed characteristics. The main findings reported in this study applied the
matching procedure using Epanechnikov kernel weights to match youth between Cohort
1 and Cohort 2. Kernel matching estimates the average treatment effect by nonpara-
metric kernel regression where the weights are obtained through a multiplicative kernel
using the Epanechnikov function. While there are multiple methods to use in match-
ing, the Epanechnikov kernel method is becoming standard in the matching literature
(Binzel and Assaad, 2011). To confirm the robustness of our results, we also report re-
sults from multiple matching techniques including nearest neighbor matching with and
without replacement, ten nearest neighbors matching, and Mahalanobis matching (see
Table 3.4). The standard errors for the Epanechnikov kernel method were bootstrapped
(250 iterations) and were clustered by district. Because it is still unclear if bootstrap-
ping is appropriate for nearest neighbor matching methods (Abadie and Imbens, 2008),
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we only applied this standard error estimation only to the kernel, radius matching and
Mahalanobis distance matching methods.
To construct a comparison group for this program, we matched youth who had already
participated in the program (Cohort 1) with youth who had not yet participated in
the program (Cohort 2). As discussed in the previous section, the educational, age
and marginilization selection criteria for program participation were the same across
cohorts. Because of the consistent (albiet subjective) selection criteria across the two
cohorts, the youth in the second cohort who have not yet participated make a valid
comparison group for the youth in the first cohort.
Despite the theoretical consistency of the selection process, it is still possible that the
selection process performed by community leaders may have been different in practice
between the two cohorts. The possibility of such bias necessitates a brief discussion of
directionality. If the committees that selects youth participants (whether intentionally
or not) choose youth that they believe would be most successful into the first cohort,
this would imply that our results overestimate the true impact of the program. It could
also be the case that the committee may have chosen youth to participate in the first
cohort who they think would most benefit from it (perhaps they are the poorest or most
marginalized); this would imply that our measured results are an underestimate of the
true impact of the program. After conversations with the NGO staff and community
stakeholders, we believe it is unlikely that the committees used differential criteria for
participation in the two cohorts.
As stated above, propensity score analysis matches youth in two different groups based
on 36 observable demographic characteristics, or covariates, Z. Youth are matched based
on these demographic characteristics, including: age, sex, education level, number of
children, number of dependents, rural or urban, whether or not their father is alive,
the number of people living in their house, whether or not the respondent has ever
participated in training, and the number of people who earn income in the household.
For example, we might match a 19 year old with no apprentice experience on Cohort
1 to a 19 year old in Cohort 2 who also has no apprentice experience. In addition to
this demographic information, we were able to match on variables that capture more
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subjective aspects of individual character including the participants’ values (for example,
do you value having your children educated?), life skills (for example, do you set goals
for yourself?) and family social supports (for example, are adults able to help you
in practical ways?). This matching process offers a way of correcting for the effects
of selection bias based on these available demographic, character and social support
covariates and provides a more rigorous estimation of the average impact of the program.
After matching the youth, the graph of the area of ‘common support’ shows the region
of comparable youth observations with similar characteristics across the two cohorts.
Figure 3.2 shows the histogram of common support across various propensity scores
using the Epanechnikov kernel method.5 Those youth that did not match, or are not
in the ‘area of common support’, are those who are too dissimilar to be comparable
(for example, they may be an outlier in that they have too much work experience).
Of the 434 youth in this sample, only 24-37 did not match well and were dropped
from the analysis (depending on the matching method) because they failed to meet
this condition. It is not particularly surprising that so few observations were dropped,
given that youth in each of the two cohorts were selected for the program based on
the same criteria. The fact that the sample populations are so similar helps to reduce
some of the possible bias that is usually introduced with a comparison group. After
the matches are made, the difference in means of each survey question for the two
groups, weighted by the propensity of treatment, is tested for statistical significance.
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) tells us the size of the impact of
the program, while reducing bias through the matching process. The ATT tells us the
estimated difference in the means, given that the person participated in the program.
We also calculate the percent change as the difference of the average treatment effect
on those who received programming compared to the mean of that outcome variable for
all youth in the matched sample.
Finally, linear regression provides another method for analyzing the impact of the pro-
gram on youth’s employment and financial skill outcomes using ordinary least squares
(OLS) with and without individual fixed effects. This secondary analytical method
5We use PSMATCH2 in STATA, which was developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003)
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serves as a robustness check of the findings from the ATT using propensity score anal-
ysis. In the cross-cohort linear regression, we compare estimates the impact of the
treatment using the sample of Cohort 1 post-program scores with the Cohort 2 pre-
program scores. This comparison aligns with the sample using the propensity score
matching because we are comparing the first cohort (those who have completed the
program) to the second (those who are entering the program).6 We estimate the effect
in the following OLS cross-cohort linear regression:
Yi = β0 + β1wi + i (3.4.1)
We use OLS estimation with fixed effects because of the advantage the time-invariant
characteristics of youth are absorbed in the individual fixed effect. This removes the
influence of these unobservable time-invariant factors, allowing for a less biased estimate
of the true impact of the program.
Then we estimate the effect of the program by comparing an individual to himself,
before and after the program. In the equation below, Yit represents the employment
and financial skill variables from the survey at time, t. The variable wit represents the
impact of the time of data collection, indicating whether the survey response is from
before or after the program. The coefficient of interest is β1, which is the effect of
time on individual outcomes. This is, the estimate of the average program impact.7
The individual fixed effect, αi, captures all the time in-variant individual characteristics
that affect the outcome, Y .
Yit = β0 + β1wit + αi + it (3.4.2)
6A key difference in the two methods is that PSM excludes the 24-37 individuals whose propensity
for treatment was outside the area of common support. Linear regression does not exclude these
observations.
7While the observed effect of the program, β1, captures the true effect of the program, it also
captures the effect of time-variant characteristics, such as maturity.
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While an OLS regression, even with controls for individual fixed effects, still cannot
account for all unobservable factors affecting program outcomes, the results of the second
estimation technique signal the robustness of the propensity score analysis results.
3.5 Results
This section of the paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss the sample of youth
participants and provide the descriptive statistics. Second, findings from simple non-
parametric tests are presented as a preliminary step in the analysis. Third, the results
from propensity score analysis using Epanechnikov kernel matching are discussed. Fi-
nally, linear regression results provide a robustness check of the propensity score analysis
findings.
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.5 provides descriptive statistics and balance of youth participating in Cohort 1
and Cohort 2 of the entrepreneurship training program. This table displays observable
demographic characteristics, values, social support and life characteristics before and
after the matching process. In both cohorts, there are slightly more male youth in the
program than female. The participants range in age from 14 to 26 years old, with the
average age of 20 years old. Most of the participants are located in rural areas and have
an average of seven people living in their household. Most youth live in a male-headed
household and a small percent of youth are the head of the household themselves. Many
of the youth are single and without children, however more women are married and have
children than men in the program. Overall, 16-18 percent of all youth report that their
mother is deceased and 28-39 percent report that their father is deceased.
At the start of the program, the majority (58 percent) of youth have completed only
primary school (Standard 7). In Cohort 1, only 26 percent of youth completed Form
4 and in Cohort 2, 32 percent completed Form 4 (final level of secondary school). At
the start of the program, only a small percentage of participants reported that they
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were currently employed (12 percent) and few had previously participated in vocational
or skills training or internships. Additionally, only a handful of youth had previously
started their own enterprises. Most of the participants live in households where someone
earns income, but, of these, the majority come from single income households. A very
small percentage of the youth reported that they currently have a savings account and
of those who do, most have an individual account. Only a handful of youth reported
having applied for a loan in the past and of those who have received the loan, they used
it for small business activities, school fees, selling fish, and to upgrade farming activities.
3.5.2 Propensity Score Analysis
Turning to the propensity score analysis, the findings in Table 3.1 suggest that there was
a significant impact of the program on youth in Cohort 1 (those who have completed
the program) in nine of the survey questions regarding employment and finances using
Epanechnikov kernel matching. For the questions about how easy youth think it will be
to find employment at the end of the program, their desire to be self-employed, the im-
portance of saving money and how much they are expected to share money with others,
there is essentially no difference in how participating youth and non-participating youth
responded. Further, there was no difference between participants and non-participants
in their belief that the knowledge and skills learned in the program will help them find
employment and improve their earnings. This finding suggests that youth enter the
program optimistic about their employment and earnings prospects and maintain this
belief following completion of the program.
Youth that have completed the program reported that they are significantly more knowl-
edgeable about finding employment in their community compared to those youth who
have not yet completed the program (from a starting average of 2.2 to an average of
3.0 on the four point scale). Youth who completed the program not only have more
knowledge about finding employment, but reported being substantially more knowl-
edgeable about developing a business plan than youth in the comparison group (from
2.0 to 2.9). Similarly, participating youth who completed the program reported more
confidence that they have skills desired by future employers (2.3 to 3.3). According to
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these findings, youth not only increased their knowledge about finding employment and
creating a business plan as a result of the program, but in their confidence that they
have employable skills.
With respect to financial literacy, youth who completed the program reported having
45.5 percent more knowledge about how to create a personal budget and 50.2 percent
more knowledge about tracking expenses than youth in the comparison group. Further,
youth who completed the program reported that they have 16.5 percent more financial
decision-making power in their households and 97.0 percent more savings knowledge.
Youth who finished the program are more than twice as likely to attribute their learning
about savings from the Mavuno group savings. As mentioned above, the Mavuno savings
and lending groups are a key component of the Swisscontact U-Learn program and this
experience appears to have made a substantial impact on participants. These findings
show significant increases in the financial literacy of marginalized Tanzanian youth who
have completed the nine-month U-Learn entrepreneurship-training program.
3.5.3 Linear Regression Results
Table 3.2 presents findings from a linear regression estimating the impact of the program,
displaying the results from the raw correlation coefficient and two models. The cross-
cohort linear regression model estimates the impact of the treatment using the sample of
Cohort 1 post-program scores with the Cohort 2 pre-program scores. This comparison
aligns with the sample using the propensity score matching because we are comparing
the first cohort (those who have completed the program) to the second (those who are
entering the program). For the correlation coefficient and the individual fixed effects
model, we pooled the pre-program and post-program data from both cohorts to examine
the program impact in a temporal way. The correlation coefficient shows the relationship
between each outcome variable and the effect of treatment (without an individual fixed
effect) for both cohorts.8
In the fixed effects model, we measure the impact of the program on each participant,
8This is the equivalent of the estimation in equation 3.4.2 without the fixed effect αit.
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controlling for an individual fixed effect as shown in equation 3.4.2. This model ac-
counts for the effects of each individual, including time-invariant characteristics, both
observed and unobserved. Although this model implies a parametric form (linear), un-
like propensity score analysis, the fixed effect model has the benefit that it accounts for
time invariant unobserved individual characteristics.
The linear regression findings suggest that, holding other things constant, the program
has a significantly positive impact on youth’s knowledge about employment and financial
literacy. The cross-cohort linear regression model shows large and positive impacts on
employment knowledge and confidence, knowledge about business planning, personal
accounting, and on learning how to save. These are the kind of skills, behaviors and
attitudes that can affect pathways for future employment and entrepreneurial success.
The pooled individual fixed effects model shows large and positive effects on these
same outcomes, although generally smaller effect sizes. This may be the case because
the pooled individual fixed effects model is controlling for time-invariant individual
characteristics, such as ability, that we are not able to account for in the cross-cohort
linear regression.
In adherence to the puzzling literature on training program evaluations, some of the
linear regression results leave us without consistent conclusions. For example, we observe
a positive and statistically significant impact on participants’ belief that they have skills
employers seek across both models. Yet at the same time, youth are skeptical that the
knowledge and skills they learned in the program will help them find employment. In
fact, in the cross-cohort regression, the estimate of the program impact on this outcome
is actually negative, while it is positive in the fixed effects model. It also may the
case that the youth are confident in their skills, but skeptical of the labor environment.
This may be indicative of other major hurdles youth face in the structural labor market
including corruption, lack of mobility and limited opportunities in their village.
Contrary to the findings from propensity score analysis, the fixed effects model shows
a positive effect of the program on the expectation to share most of their income with
others. Meanwhile, the propensity score analysis and the cross-cohort regression results
show an increase in a related outcome: post-program, youth reported more autonomy
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over their finances. However, the fixed effects results did not find the program to have
a significant impact on this particular variable. Due to these contradictory findings, no
conclusions can be made regarding the program’s impact on youth’s financial autonomy
or the expectation to share their income. The consistency in propensity score analysis
and the regression results allows us to conclude that there is a large and significant
improvement in participants’ employment knowledge and financial literacy. The largest
effect of the program was on learning to save. This finding reiterates the focus of the
U-Learn program in improving the savings knowledge and behavior of participants. Not
only do the Mavuno saving and lending groups appear to have an important impact on
the participants’ impression of the program, but youth’s knowledge about how to apply
for a savings account significantly increased over the course of the program as well.
Across the nonparametric tests, propensity score analysis, and linear regression results,
we observe of large and positive impacts on employment knowledge and confidence,
knowledge about business planning, personal accounting, and savings knowledge. The
consistency of the results under the different models shows that the program effect
is not sensitive to the methodology and provides evidence of a successful educational
program.9
3.5.4 Discussion
This study answers the research question: How did the U-Learn entrepreneurship train-
ing program affect youth knowledge, skills, and attitudes? The findings indicate that
the U-Learn entrepreneurship training program in Tanzania increased participants’ self-
reported knowledge in statistically significant and meaningful ways.
Beyond the substantive finding about training programs, the present study reinforces
the use of propensity score analysis using successive cohorts of youth participants as
a workable means of establishing a comparison group. Because the same community
members governing the U-Learn program selected both cohorts under the same criteria,
9It is also important to note that these self-reported outcomes are measured immediately following
participation in the program. The estimates of the impact of the program within the time-frame of the
study do not ensure that the impact will continue for the participant’s lifetime.
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much of the possible unobservable biases that could be introduced using the second co-
hort as a comparison group were avoided. Governments and international development
organizations are increasingly expressing a commitment to emphasize evidence-based
practice, yet observe the weakness of available evidence. This paper builds on the non-
randomized evaluation literature to promote rigorous examination of the effects of social
programs using multiple analysis techniques, including propensity score analysis, and a
sensitivity analysis to confirm robustness of the results. While RCTs are the gold stan-
dard in causal impact evaluation, less disruptive methodologies such as propensity score
analysis provide insight into the effects of entrepreneurship training on youth without
undermining local authority and capacity.
While most of the development literature addresses the impact of training programs on
income-related measurements, such as asset-accumulation or employment status, this
program presents evidence on the intermediary effects of training programs. In par-
ticular, this study focuses on the attitudes and perceptions of the participants, rather
than their direct employment. These measurements are more subjective; for example,
students reported whether they think it will be easier to find a job. However, this in-
formation provides insight into the mechanisms of employment trajectories, which is of
particular relevance for short-term training policy. Evaluations that focus simply on
the final income-related measurements of the program may overlook the pathways in
which youth experience positive effects of the program. Our results build on business
knowledge changes observed in the Karlan and Valdivia (2011) training program eval-
uation. In both studies, it is possible that employment and income affects may reveal
themselves years after the period of evaluation. This study seeks to gain insight into
the steps towards employment or small business ownership that were enabled by the
program’s human capital improvement.
The findings offer support to governments, NGOs and policy makers around the globe
who encourage entrepreneurship programming as a way of tackling youth unemploy-
ment. The U-Learn program illustrates that training policies for marginalized young
people in Tanzania can be effective in helping youth develop the knowledge and skills
they will need to improve their livelihoods. Such findings must be kept in perspective,
however. A variety of factors external to individuals’ knowledge, skills, and attitudes
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may affect their ability to find or create employment opportunities. Even the best
training cannot overcome lack of capital, exclusion from financial services, pervasive
corruption, and social prejudice that youth face as they enter the labor market. Fur-
ther, while we show the effect of the program on youth’s attitudes, skills and knowledge,
the short time-frame of the study does not allow us to measure the impact of the pro-
gram on long-term employment or income. And while results suggest that training can
have a positive impact on youth’s knowledge and skills, the utilization of that train-
ing will depend on a wider variety of social policy and supportive conditions being in
place. Regardless, identifying successful ways to enable youth to improve their liveli-
hoods not only alleviates immediate poverty, but gives meaning to the lives of young
people through confidence, occupation and independence.
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3.6 Figures
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Data Collection of the Two
Participating Youth Cohorts
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Figure 3.2: Area of Common Support for Propensity
Score Matching
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Table 3.1: Propensity Score Analysis Findings using
Epanechnikov Kernel Matching
 
Variable 
ATT 
(Standard Error) 
Percent 
Change 
Do you know how to find employment in your community? 1.04*** 
(0.14) 
55.32% 
 Do you know how to develop a business plan? 1.21*** 
(0.13) 
70.35% 
How easy do you think it will be to find employment at the 
end of this program? 
0.12 
(0.16) 
4.12% 
Would you like to be self-employed? 0.18 
(0.13) 
5.03% 
Will the knowledge and skills you learn in this program 
help you find employment? 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
3.59% 
Will the knowledge and skills you learn in this program 
help improve your earnings? 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.57% 
Do you have skills that employers are looking for? 1.19*** 
(0.25) 
61.66% 
Do you know how to create a personal budget? 0.97*** 
(0.18) 
45.54% 
How much do you know about tracking your expenses? 1.05*** 
(0.22) 
50.24% 
When you have money, are you able to decide how to use 
it? 
0.45*** 
(0.21) 
16.54% 
Do you know how to apply for a savings account? 1.27*** 
(0.21) 
96.95% 
How important is it to you to save money? -0.07 
(0.13) 
1.90% 
Has group savings helped you to learn to save (on your 
own)? 
1.83*** 
(0.27) 
108.28% 
How comfortable do you feel borrowing money from a 
savings or credit institution? 
0.98*** 
(0.28) 
58.68% 
When you have money, are you expected to share most of 
your money with others? 
Observations 
-0.06 
(0.15) 
434 
2.46% 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.2: Linear Regression Program Impact Estima-
tion
 
Outcome Variable 
 
Cross-cohort 
Linear 
Regression  
(SE) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Pooled Individual  
Fixed Effects  
Model 
 (SE) 
Do you know how to find employment in your 
community? 
1.002*** 
(0.083) 
0.935*** 
(0.054) 
0.942*** 
(0.053) 
 Do you know how to develop a business plan? 1.115*** 
(0.093) 
1.014*** 
(0.055) 
1.012*** 
(0.053) 
How easy do you think it will be to find 
employment at the end of this program? 
0.202** 
(0.086) 
0.292*** 
(0.053) 
0.294*** 
(0.048) 
Would you like to be self-employed? 0.214*** 
(0.080) 
0.071 
(0.049) 
0.071* 
(0.042) 
Will the knowledge and skills you learn in this 
program help you find employment? 
-0.139** 
(0.063) 
 
0.059 
(0.040) 
0.061* 
(0.038) 
Will the knowledge and skills you learn in this 
program help improve your earnings? 
0.007 
(0.065) 
0.108** 
(0.042) 
0.108*** 
(0.035) 
Do you have skills that employers are looking 
for? 
1.267*** 
(0.088) 
1.155*** 
(0.057) 
1.150*** 
(0.057) 
Do you know how to create a personal budget? 1.019*** 
(0.097) 
0.844*** 
(0.060) 
0.844*** 
(0.058) 
How much do you know about tracking your 
expenses? 
1.132*** 
(0.098) 
0.867*** 
(0.060) 
0.871*** 
(0.057) 
When you have money, are you able to decide 
how to use it? 
0.498*** 
(0.103) 
0.083 
(0.062) 
0.083 
(0.062) 
Do you know how to apply for a savings 
account? 
1.043*** 
(0.099) 
1.161*** 
(0.064) 
1.162*** 
(0.058) 
How important is it to you to save money? -0.031 
(0.056) 
0.108** 
(0.042) 
0.104*** 
(0.039) 
Has group savings helped you to learn to save 
(on your own)? 
1.791*** 
(0.096) 
1.641*** 
(0.060) 
1.640*** 
(0.060) 
How comfortable do you feel borrowing money 
from a savings or credit institution? 
0.874*** 
(0.103) 
0.862*** 
(0.070) 
0.862*** 
(0.061) 
When you have money, are you expected to share 
most of your money with others?  
Observations 
0.071 
(0.099) 
434 
0.327*** 
(0.060) 
868 
0.330*** 
(0.055) 
868 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.3: Questionnaire Response Options
Survey Question Response Options 
Do you know how to find employment in your community?  1 I know almost nothing          
2 I know a little                   
3 I know some things        
4 I know a lot  
Do you know how to develop a business plan? 1 I know almost nothing    
2 I know a little                   
3 I know some things         
4 I know a lot  
How easy do you think it will be to find employment at the end of 
this program? 
1 Not at all                             
2 A little                                 
3 Somewhat easy               
4 Very easy 
Would you like to be self-employed? 1 Not at all                             
2 A little                                 
3 Somewhat                         
4 Very much 
Will the knowledge and skills you learn in this program help you 
find employment? 
1 Not at all                             
2 A little                                 
3 Somewhat                         
4 A great deal 
Will the knowledge and skills you learn in this program help 
improve your earnings? 
1 Not at all                             
2 A little                                 
3 Somewhat                         
4 A great deal 
Do you have skills that employers are looking for? 1 Not at all                             
2 A little                                 
3 Somewhat                         
4 Many 
Do you know how to create a personal budget?  1 I know almost nothing    
2 I know a little                   
3 I know some things          
4 I know a lot  
How much do you know about tracking your expenses?  1 I know almost nothing    
2 I know a little                   
3 I know some things          
4 I know a lot  
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Table 3.4: Propensity Score Matching Sensitivity
Analysis
 
Near 
neighbor 
replacement 
Near 
neighbor no 
replace-
ment 
10 
nearest 
neigh-
bors 
Radius 
matching 
Kernel 
matching 
Epanech-
nikov 
kernel 
matching 
Mahalan-
obis 
matching 
Do you know how to find 
employment in your community? 
0.94*** 
(0.14) 
1.03***  
(0.08) 
0.99*** 
(0.11) 
1.11***      
(0.17) 
1.06*** 
(0.19) 
1.04*** 
(0.14) 
0.91*** 
(0.15) 
Do you know how to develop a 
business plan? 
1.16*** 
(0.15) 
1.19***  
(0.09) 
1.17*** 
(0.11) 
1.25*** 
(0.19) 
1.22*** 
(0.17) 
1.21*** 
(0.13) 
1.17*** 
(0.14) 
How easy do you think it will be 
to find employment at the end of 
this program/school? 
0.18  
(0.13) 
0.18**  
(0.08) 
0.14  
(0.11) 
0.22*  
(0.14) 
0.11  
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.16) 
0.14  
(0.14) 
Would you like to be self-
employed? 
0.11 
(0.13) 
0.15**  
(0.07) 
0.18  
(0.10) 
0.28** 
(0.17) 
0.17 
 (0.16) 
0.18 
(0.13) 
0.10  
(0.09) 
Will the knowledge and skills 
you learn in this program/school 
help you find employment? 
-0.20  
(0.09) 
-0.15**  
(0.06) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
-0.11*** 
(0.14) 
-0.14* 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.11*** 
(0.12) 
Will the knowledge and skills 
you learn in this program/school 
help you improve your earnings? 
0.09  
(0.11) 
-0.02  
(0.06) 
0.06  
(0.08) 
-0.01  
(0.12) 
0.01  
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.18) 
-0.03  
(0.12) 
Do you have skills that employers 
are looking for? 
1.09*** 
(0.15) 
1.29***  
(0.08) 
1.21*** 
(0.12) 
1.02***  
(0.26) 
1.24*** 
(0.23) 
1.19*** 
(0.25) 
1.00*** 
(0.22) 
Do you know how to create a 
personal budget? 
1.02*** 
(0.18) 
1.06***  
(0.09) 
1.01*** 
(0.13) 
0.94***  
(0.23) 
1.00*** 
(0.18) 
0.97*** 
(0.18) 
0.81*** 
(0.29) 
How much do you know about 
tracking your expenses? 
1.04*** 
(0.17) 
1.17***  
(0.09) 
1.07*** 
(0.13) 
0.98***  
(0.27) 
1.07*** 
(0.23) 
1.05*** 
(0.22) 
0.86*** 
(0.23) 
When you have money, are you 
able to decide how to use it? 
0.62*** 
(0.18) 
0.51***  
(0.09) 
0.58*** 
(0.14) 
0.45***  
(0.30) 
0.47*** 
(0.18) 
0.45*** 
(0.21) 
0.44*** 
(0.16) 
Do you know how to apply for a 
savings account? 
1.43*** 
(0.14) 
1.26***  
(0.10) 
1.26*** 
(0.12) 
1.25***  
(0.27) 
1.27*** 
(0.19) 
1.27*** 
(0.21) 
1.12*** 
(0.19) 
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Table 3.5: Covariate Matching Results for Epanech-
nikov PSM Estimator
  Mean t-Test 
    
Variable Sample Treated 
(n=202) 
Control 
(n=232) 
t-
statistic 
p-value 
Female Unmatched 0.424 0.476 -1.100 0.273 
 Matched 0.418 0.440 -0.420 0.674 
Age Unmatched 20.33 20.42 -0.330 0.743 
 Matched 20.30 20.50 -0.750 0.453 
Married Unmatched 0.182 0.104 2.350 0.019 
 Matched 0.163 0.146 0.460 0.649 
Have children Unmatched 0.448 0.177 3.930 0.000 
 Matched 0.380 0.429 -0.510 0.609 
Have dependents Unmatched 1.813 0.961 5.080 0.000 
 Matched 1.794 1.608 0.910 0.361 
Rural Unmatched 0.724 0.407 6.980 0.000 
 Matched 0.701 0.693 0.170 0.868 
Mother is alive Unmatched 0.842 0.823 0.550 0.582 
 Matched 0.842 0.845 -0.0600 0.952 
Father is alive Unmatched 0.616 0.723 -2.380 0.018 
 Matched 0.641 0.598 0.860 0.392 
Last grade completed Unmatched 9.098 8.866 0.490 0.626 
 Matched 9.098 9.045 0.0900 0.924 
Number of people living in household Unmatched 7.251 6.554 2.360 0.019 
Matched 7.098 6.994 0.310 0.755 
Youth previously participated in vocational 
or skills training before entering the 
program 
Unmatched 0.0985 0.165 -2.020 0.044 
Matched 0.103 0.113 -0.300 0.767 
Youth were employed at the start of the 
program 
Unmatched 0.124 0.117 0.220 0.827 
Matched 0.114 0.108 0.180 0.859 
Youth had participated in an internship 
before entering the program 
Unmatched 0.222 0.286 -1.530 0.128 
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  Mean t-Test 
    
Variable Sample Treated 
(n=202) 
Control 
(n=232) 
t-
statistic 
p-value 
Youth had participated in an internship 
before entering the program 
Unmatched 0.222 0.286 -1.530 0.128 
Matched 0.234 0.267 -0.740 0.463 
Number of people earning income in the 
household 
Unmatched 1.473 1.684 -1.920 0.056 
Matched 1.500 1.579 -0.650 0.515 
Youth entered the program with a savings 
account 
 
Unmatched 0.0591 0.0693 -0.430 0.668 
Matched 0.0652 0.0573 0.310 0.754 
Youth had applied for a loan before 
entering the program 
Unmatched 0.0345 0.0390 -0.250 0.805 
Matched 0.0326 0.0217 0.640 0.521 
Before making a decision about spending 
money, do you consider the options? 
Unmatched 3.232 3 2.650 0.008 
Matched 3.207 3.264 -0.610 0.541 
Do you think making good decisions can 
improve your life? 
Unmatched 3.665 3.656 0.140 0.889 
Matched 3.685 3.742 -0.960 0.340 
Are you willing to speak up for your ideas 
when a friend disagrees with you? 
Unmatched 3.626 3.470 2.210 0.027 
 Matched 3.625 3.704 -1.180 0.241 
When something you try fails, do you try 
again? 
Unmatched 3.222 3.260 -0.480 0.635 
Matched 3.239 3.340 -1.130 0.260 
Are you confident in your work skills? Unmatched 2.902 2.433 3.880 0.000 
Matched 2.853 2.727 0.940 0.347 
Do you set goals for yourself? Unmatched 3.389 3.052 3.710 0.000 
Matched 3.348 3.480 -1.490 0.137 
Do you take action to achieve these goals? Unmatched 3.054 2.661 4.380 0.000 
Matched 3.011 3.123 -1.180 0.237 
Has your life improved because you have 
made good decisions? 
Unmatched 2.823 2.584 2.810 0.005 
Matched 2.810 2.851 -0.460 0.648 
How important is it to you to get additional 
training or education after completing this 
program? 
Unmatched 3.749 3.429 4.790 0.000 
Matched 3.728 3.709 0.310 0.757 
Are people your age (peers) willing to listen 
when you are having problems?   
Unmatched 2.916 2.857 0.750 0.454 
Matched 2.913 2.830 0.930 0.352 
Are adults you know willing to help you in 
practical ways (loan money, meals, or 
clothes)? 
Unmatched 2.759 2.389 4.370 0.000 
Matched 2.712 2.716 -0.0500 0.960 
Are adults you know available when you 
need them? 
Unmatched 3.044 2.652 4.770 0.000 
Matched 2.967 3.003 -0.400 0.692 
Do you value being employed? Unmatched 3.709 3.596 1.790 0.074 
Matched 3.717 3.778 -1.040 0.299 
Do you value owning your own business? Unmatched 3.700 3.465 3.270 0.001 
Matched 3.690 3.734 -0.700 0.486 
Observations Unmatched 226 235   
Matched 202 232   
 
Chapter 4
Favoritism and Farming:
Agricultural Productivity and
Wife Order in Polygynous
Households
4.1 Introduction
Women play a key role in Sub-Saharan African food production, where they make up
the majority of small-scale farmers and produce 60 to 70 percent of the food supply
(Gawaya, 2008). This large contribution to agricultural production is viewed as a con-
tributing source of the persistence of polygyny (Jacoby, 1995). Gendered determinants
of intra-marriage bargaining power, such as education, large age differentials, and lack
of access to credit may have a negative effect on women’s agricultural productivity.
Polygyny can alter the bargaining power structure within the household through the
additional resource competition, or improved cooperation, or both. However, it is not
yet clear what effect polygyny has on the distribution of agricultural resources across
plots managed by men and women in the same household. I explore the effect of the
number of wives, wife order and joint plot management on agricultural productivity for
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farming households in Tanzania.1
This paper builds on a well-established body of literature that examines the sources
of agricultural productivity differences between men and women. Led by the seminal
work of Udry (1996), a number of studies (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; Akresh,
2005; Rangel and Thomas, 2012) test for Pareto efficiency through comparisons of agri-
cultural yield differences across plots within households. Efforts to achieve efficiency
may be complicated by the household structure and the family heirarchy of polygyny.
Akresh, Chen, and Moore (2011) find that, in Burkina Faso, polygynous households have
lower yield differences between spouses and thus are more productively efficient than
monogamous households. This result stands in contrast to the findings by Peterman
et al. (2011); they conclude that the differences in agricultural productivity between
men and women in Uganda and Nigeria are, in fact, driven by the less efficient polyg-
ynous households in both countries. Dauphin (2013) finds mixed evidence of the effect
of polygyny on yield in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. Her explanation is that the
influence of polygyny on intra-household efficiency is subject to cultural context, which
is often determined by tribe, geography and local norms. While these papers provide
an excellent starting point for an examination of agricultural productivity differences
between monogamous and polygynous households, it is not yet clear what effect wife
order has on allocative efficiency across plots that are jointly managed in polygynous
households.
Cooperation among co-wives in a polygynous household would be most efficient; how-
ever, the anthropological evidence indicates that co-wife relationships within polygynous
households in Sub-Saharan Africa are often characterized by negative competition and
conflict. Jankowiak, Sudakov, and Wilreker (2005) and Kazianga and Klonner (2009)
find evidence of competition and an unequal distribution of wealth across co-wives.
Rates of polygyny are declining in Tanzania, but the practice is still common. Ac-
cording to the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) of the OECD, 23 percent
of Tanzanian women were in polygynous marriages in the 2004-2005 Demographic and
Health Surveys (DHS), a drop from 29 percent during the 1990s. To better understand
1This chapter is co-authored with Amy L. Damon and Vincent Siegerink.
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the role of polygyny in household production in Tanzania, I measure its effect on agri-
cultural allocative efficiency across plots, and as a function of each person’s position in
the household.
Extremely few plots are managed solely by women, thus this analysis compares the effect
of polygyny on jointly managed plots (jointly managed by the husband and at least one
wife) versus male-only managed plots. Plot management in the sample was determined
by the survey question “who decided what to plant on this plot?” Forty-eight percent
of crops are managed jointly by husbands and wives. Although ownership and decision-
making may be subject to reporting bias, these measurements are commonly used in
the literature. In this sample, the average number of wives in married households is
1.22 in 2009, 1.23 in 2011 and 1.25 in 2013. I examine the effect of resident wives (wives
living in the sampled household) in the of polygyny, which limits the number of wives
in this sample to two.2 Additionally, most second wives that manage plots, do so with
the first wife as well (89 percent). However, for households that have two wives, only
eight percent of the first wife’s jointly managed plots are also jointly managed with the
second wife.
Although there is a large literature on the effect of polygyny on agricultural productivity
in West Africa, I expand this test for efficiency to the East African context and, to the
best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to do so using agricultural data. I also
build on the understanding of household intra-household power structures by examining
the effect of joint plot management by the first and second wife, exploiting differences
in bargaining power and seniority within the household.
2Fifty three percent of polygynous households in the sample include all of the husband’s wives (i.e.
do not have non-resident wives). Thus, in about half of all polygynous households, a husband has other
wives who are not counted in this analysis. The definition of a household, according to LSMS-ISA
is ”people who live together and share income and also basic needs. In other words, residents of a
household share the same center of production and consume from that center.”
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4.2 Conceptual Framework
In the conceptual model, similar to that of Udry (1996), I develop the conditions that
should hold if the household is operating plots efficiently. I then test whether the number
of wives or joint management in the household has an effect on the efficient allocation
of resources. For the sake of understanding the intra-household relationship between
men and women, I limit the household size in this model to three: a husband and two
wives.
Each person in the household has his/her own utility function:
Uh(Ch, Cw1, Cw2, Z) (4.2.1)
Uw1(Ch, Cw1, Cw2, Z) (4.2.2)
Uw2(Ch, Cw1, Cw2, Z) (4.2.3)
where:
h = husband; w1 = wife 1; w2 = wife 2 (4.2.4)
The arguments of the household utility function are as follows: C is the consumption of
private goods and Z is the consumption of a public good. Total labor for each individual,
N is fixed and thus does not appear in the utility functions. Consumption and labor
supply are indexed specifically for each member of the household. Total consumption
of private goods is constrained by:
C = Ch + Cw1 + Cw2 (4.2.5)
Public good production (i.e. cooked meals or a clean house) within the household is
determined by the labor allocated from each household member:
Z = Z(NZw1, N
Z
w2, N
Z
h ) (4.2.6)
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Production (Y ) of crop k in the household is defined as:
Y k = ΣiPkB
k(N iw1, N
i
w2, N
i
h, A
i, T i) (4.2.7)
Here, i is an index for different plots of land controlled by the household, for production
of some crop, k; P k denotes the set of plots on which k is grown. N indicates husband
and wives’ labor applied to plot i, A is the land area of plot i, and T is the amount of
inputs (e.g. fertilizer) allocated to plot i. Bk is the production function and is assumed
to be concave in all arguments. The technology of production is permitted to vary
across crops, but not across plots within a single crop. The restrictions for male and
female labor supply are a function of time spent on plots and on household public good
production:
Nw1 = N
z
w + Σ
I
i=1N
i
w1 (4.2.8)
Nw2 = N
z
w + Σ
I
i=1N
i
w2 (4.2.9)
Nh = N
z
h + Σ
I
i=1N
i
h (4.2.10)
This restriction implies that household labor can be allocated to either production of
the household public goods or to farming across all plots, i. Without leisure in the
model, the total amount of labor allocation for each household member is fixed. This
simplification implies that individuals choose between allocating time to the household
public good or to plots. Similar to Udry (1996), this framework assumes that there are
no labor or land markets.
The maximization problem is also subject to the household budget constraint:
p · C ≤ p · Y (4.2.11)
A cooperative household, which by definition is efficient, would have a kind of sharing
rule that is based on a household utility function that is a weighted average of the
utilities of the three members. Thus, the household needs to choose Cw1, Cw2, Ch; Nw1,
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Nw2, Nh for each plot; and N
z
w1, N
z
w2, N
z
h , to maximize:
U = µ1Uh(Ch, Cw1, Cw2, Z,Nh, Nw1, Nw2) + µ2Uw1(Ch, Cw1, Cw2, Z,Nh, Nw1, Nw2)+
µ3Uw2(Ch, Cw1, Cw2, Z,Nh, Nw1, Nw2) (4.2.12)
µ1 + µ2 + µ3 = 1 (4.2.13)
Maximization of this household utility function (4.2) is subject to the budget constraint
(4.2.11), production technology (4.2.7), household labor conditions (4.2.8)-(4.2.10) and
technology for producing Z public goods (4.2.6). Equation 4.2.13 is a normalization.
There is no leisure in this model. If the household is operating efficiently, this maximiza-
tion problem implies that the household would choose the same allocation of inputs over
these plots as the production maximization problem (maximizing the crop production
function, Bk, subject to optimal aggregate labor allocations to each crop). In other
words, conditional on optimal amounts of inputs and of each of the three types of labor
to each crop, efficiency implies that household utility is maximized if labor and agri-
cultural inputs are allocated across plots in which crop k is grown in the way that also
maximizes production of that crop.
Additionally, if I assume that Bk is increasing in all arguments, and strictly increasing in
land area, Ai, then, under Pareto efficiency, two plots of the same size and characteristics
should yield the same output, regardless of the gender of the cultivator. This leads to
the main testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Conditional on inputs, if the cooperative household model holds, the gen-
der and wife order of the plot managers (and thus, whether the plot is jointly managed
by the first wife or the second wife) should not be a significant predictor of yield.
The standard separation result of an agricultural household model should hold, where
production decisions are independent of preferences within the household.3 Any dif-
ferences in yield based on whether the plot is jointly managed will thus be evident of
3This assumes that hired labor is a perfect substitute for household labor.
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intra-household allocative inefficiency.
4.3 Empirical Approach
This paper uses the Tanzania National Panel Survey (TZNPS), which is one of the LSMS
Integrated Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA), to examine households’ distribution of
agricultural inputs across plots in polygynous and monogamous households. Using the
three waves of this household survey, 2008-2009, 2011 and 2013, allows the ability to
examine the effect of longitudinal household changes in marital status, such as entering
into a monogamous marriage or gaining an additional wife.
The TZNPS was initiated to provide comprehensive high-quality household-level data
to the government of Tanzania, with the aim of evaluating policy initiatives to alleviate
poverty. The nationally representative survey includes a wide range of information on
household characteristics, including family composition, labor, health and education.
The agricultural data include land characteristics, outputs and inputs, separately for
each plot. The data were collected for each crop planted on a specific plot. Information
was also collected about the management of the plot (who decides what to plant), as
well as crop-level information such as the quantity harvested and the area (acreage) on
which that crop was harvested. Multiple crops are often harvested on a single plot.4
When the data have been matched across waves, plots and crops, the sample includes
891 households, 1283 plots and 1603 crop-level observations. The main outcomes of
interest are yield (measured as kilograms per acre), fertilizer used per acre (kilograms per
acre), labor applied per acre (person-days of labor) and total crop value (using farmer-
estimated prices for all crops). The outcome variables are logarithmically-transformed
using the inverse hyperbolic sine function to adjust for a large number of zeros.
As indicated above, the assumption of household production efficiency implies that
variations in yield across plots or crops should be explained entirely by plot or crop
4Our analysis takes place on the crop level. While some of the agricultural variables are recorded
at the crop level, many are recorded at the plot level. So in most cases I apply plot-level characteristics
to crop-level observations. This implies the assumption that inputs are allocated equally across crops
on the same plot.
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characteristics. I examine whether this holds by evaluating the difference in yields
between joint and husband-only plots. Here I examine equal yield for plots (i), defining
yield per unit of land as Qk(Ai):
Qk(Ai) = (Bk[N iw1(A
i), N iw2(A
i), N ih(A
i), T i(Ai)])/Ai (4.3.1)
If the cooperative household model holds, the yield of plot i of household h for crop k
should depend only on the plot characteristics and input quantities, not on the number
of wives or wife order of the plot manager. Using this definition of yield, I can test
whether polygyny, joint management and wife order affect the yield on the plot. In a
second test of Pareto efficiency, I test whether polygyny affects the use of agricultural
inputs such as labor, fertilizer and pesticide. Differences in agricultural input allocation
for joint and husband-only plots would indicate greater or lesser extents of allocative
efficiency in polygynous households.
I first estimate the 2009 cross-sectional effect of the number of wives on the yield of crop
k in year t for household h on plot i by running the following ordinary least squares
regression:
Qhtki = β1Xhtki + β2Ghtki + β3Fhtki + htki (4.3.2)
Here, X represents plot characteristics, G is an indication of a plot jointly managed with
husband and wife, F represents the number of wives. The effect of the number of wives
is captured by the parameter β3, and β2 represents the effect of joint plot management
on yield, Q. As the final agricultural outcome, yield should capture any allocative
inefficiencies across plots, however, I also test for allocative inefficiency using the same
regression with fertilizer, labor and total crop value as outcomes. Equation (4.3.2)
represents a cross-sectional test of Pareto efficiency within the household. Efficiently
producing polygynous households are then given by (β2 = β3 = 0). The possible effects
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of polygyny are the following:
β3 < 0; polygynous households are less efficient (4.3.3)
β3 = 0; polygyny has no effect (4.3.4)
β3 > 0; polygynous households are more efficient (4.3.5)
The possible effects of the number of wives and of joint management are suggested by the
previously described anthropological and economic accounts of polygynous households.
For example, the scenario described in equation (4.3.5) may be explained by greater
cooperation between wives in polygynous households (Akresh, Chen, and Moore, 2011).
Alternatively, polygyny could be a source of conflict that jeopardizes overall productiv-
ity, which would result in equation (4.3.3). It is possible that β2 and β3 have opposite
signs. If β2 < 0 and β3 > 0, then the polygyny has a positive effect on yield, but joint
management has a negative effect on yield, implying a possible cooperation benefit of
additional persons in the household, but an inefficient allocation of agricultural inputs.
And if β2 > 0 and β3 < 0, then polygyny has a negative effect on yield and joint
management has a positive effect on yield, implying that additional wives may reduce
productivity but jointly managed plots are more efficient.
In a more narrow analysis to understand the effect of wife order in polygyny, I measure
the differential effects of the first and the second wife joint management on agricultural
productivity with interaction terms. To do this, I estimate the following equation:
Qhtki = β1Xhtki + β2G1htki + β3G2htki + β4Fhtki + β5(Fhtki ∗G1htki)+ (4.3.6)
β6(Fhtki ∗G2htki) + htki
In this estimation, β2 represents the effect of joint management of the husband with
the first wife and β3 represents the effect of joint management of the husbanda with the
second wife.5 And as previously stated, the analysis of resident wives limits the sample
to households with a maximum of two wives. First wives tend to have the most seniority,
5As indidcated in the introduction, most plots that are managed by the second wife with husbands
are also managed by the first wife. So effectively, this is the effect of joint management between three
people.
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thus, the effect of joint plot management with a first wife is likely to be different than
the effect with a second wife. I expect that the coefficient on joint management for wife
1 (β2) to be negative for the first wife, implying that joint management would results in
lower agricultural input allocations and that this would negatively affect yield. These
results would corroborate those of Udry (1996). As an extension of the traditional
model, I expect that this term for the second wife, (β3) to be positive, implying that
the involvement of the second wife in joint management would have a positive effect on
yield and inputs. In a household with two resident wives, I hypothesize that having the
second wife also as a plot manager is an indicator of concentrated effort on production
for that plot. Additionally, β5 and β6 capture the effect of wife order interacted with
jointly-managed plots. Equation (4.3.6) is estimated using 2011 cross-sectional data in
Table 4.4 and using 2013 cross-sectional data in Table 4.5. Again, Qhtki represents the
main agricultural outcomes (maize yield, fertilizer, labor and crop value) for household
h, crop k, plot i at time t.
To account for time-invariant characteristics of households, plots and crops that affect
agricultural yield, I combine all three years of data and estimate the following regression
with fixed effects:
Qhtki = β1Xhtki + β2G1htki + β3G2htki + β4Fhtki + β5(Fhtki ∗G1htki)+ (4.3.7)
β6(Fhtki ∗G2htki) + αhki + htki
where αhki is a fixed effect pertaining to household h for crop k and plot i. This
regression is estimated over three waves of data, where t represents year. The fixed
effect captures the average household, plot and crop average levels of covariates over
the three years, thus X represents the effect the changes in the covariates over the three
years of observation.6 In this model, β2 and β3 represent the effect of changes in joint
management with the first and second wife in the household. I again anticipate in this
fixed effects model that the coefficient on joint management with the first wife would
6Fifteen percent of of plot observations are dropped due to changes in the cultivated crops over
2009-2013.
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be positive and that the coefficient on joint management with the second wife would be
negative. Finally, β5 and β6 capture the interaction effect of jointly managed plots and
changes in the number wives. Table 4.6 estimates equation (4.3.7) for outcomes maize
yield, fertilizer use, labor use and crop value.
In the examination of the effect of a household characteristic, such as number of wives
and joint management, on yield, it is important to understand directionality of bias.
Polygyny is likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics of the household
such as wealth,7 preferences for family size and farmer quality that may affect yield
(Jacoby, 1995; Akresh et al, 2011). Polygyny has been instrumented in the literature by
quantity of land inherited and ethnicity (Akresh et al, 2011; Dauphin, 2013). Ethnicity,
although collected in the LSMS-ISA, is not publicly released. Quantity of land inherited
was also collected, but only 3 percent of agricultural households answered this question
(possibility to due sensitivity issues around land ownership in Tanzania). I did perform
the analysis using the ratio of boys to girls in a household and religion as instruments
for polygyny, but the instruments often had weak explanatory power that resulted in
low F-statistics.
In Tanzania, polygyny is an expensive investment due to bride prices. It is common
practice for husbands to pay a bride price (ten to fifty cattle) to the parents of the
new wife. Because of this, polygyny is highly correlated with wealth. Although I
control for household consumption in all regressions, it is likely that the error term
captures unobserved wealth that is positively correlated with yield and agricultural
inputs. Wealthier farmers are likely to have better knowledge of cultivation practices
and are likely to be more able to afford purchasing agricultural inputs such as hired labor
and fertilizer. In this case, the observed coefficient on total wives would over-estimate
the effect of polygyny on yield and agricultural inputs. This omitted variable bias would
also over-estimate the effect of joint management on yield and agricultural inputs as
well. Another possible source of bias is reverse causality. Larger yields may give way
to the ability to afford an additional wife. This would also result in an overestimate
of the impact of polygyny on yield. Measurement error is the final source of bias in
this estimation strategy. Imprecise estimates of land area, amounts of harvested crops,
7Although I control for monthly household consumption, wealth is not directly observed.
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and prices, in addition to recall bias in use of agricultural inputs may either upwardly
or downwardly bias the estimate of the impact of polygyny and joint management on
agricultural productivity.
The current analysis includes cross-sectional analysis for multiple years and a household-
crop-plot fixed effect regression to measure changes over time. The cross-sectional anal-
ysis only controls for observable plot and household characteristics in the estimation of
the impact of polygyny on agricultural productivity. However, the fixed effects model
accounts for time-invariant unobservable household, plot and crop-level characteristics.
4.4 Descriptive Statistics
I begin the examination of the effect of polygyny on plot input allocation with descrip-
tive statistics of each plot by various changes in marital status between across waves
(2009 to 2011 and 2011 to 2013). Table 4.1 shows the variation in outcomes (yield),
inputs (fertilizer, farm size, soil quality) and and other characteristics (monthly house-
hold consumption and joint management) across changes in marital status. Average
fertilizer usage per hectare is significantly different for those households that enter into
a monogamous marriage and those that enter into a polygynous marriage. Yields are
highest among household that entered into monogamous marriages, lower for those in
polygynous marriages and lowest for unmarried household heads (male or female). The
household heads that enter into a monogamous marriage between 2009 and 2013 are
also much less likely to jointly manage plots with their new spouses relative to polyg-
ynous marriages, and this may be a likely factor in the higher yield in monogamous
households.
Table 4.2 shows plot and household descriptive statistics over the time period of the
panel. The average number of wives in the entire sample is .778 in 2009, .841 in 2011 and
.90 in 2013. And as households increase the number of wives (or enter into marriages),
they also jointly manage more of their plots. In 2009, 35.5 percent of plots are jointly
managed, but by 2013, 52.3 percent of plots are jointly managed. These changes in
household dynamics and plot level management over time allow us to measure the effect
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of polygyny on agricultural productivity.
4.5 Results and Discussion
In the investigation of the relationship between polygyny and agricultural efficiency, I
first examine the effect of total wives and joint management on yield using a 2009 cross-
sectional estimation. In Table 4.3, I see that number of wives had no effect on maize
yield or crop value. However, polygyny is associated with fewer agricultural inputs.
Column (2) shows that the total number of wives in a household has a negative and
significant relationship with fertilizer use, while column (3) shows a negative and signif-
icant relationship with quantity of labor applied to the crop (measured in person-days).
Note that these estimations are cross-sectional and without fixed effects. While the true
relationship is causal, the aforementioned possible econometric problems (omitted vari-
ables, reverse causality and measurement error) may introduce bias into my estimation
of the effect. The later results from the fixed effects estimation are less likely to have
such bias.
In this 2009 cross-sectional analysis, I also examine the effect of joint plot management
on yield, inputs and crop value. In column (2), joint management of the husband with
wife one has a positive and significant (10% level) relationship with fertilizer use and in
column (4) joint management of the husband with wife one has a positive and significant
relationship with crop value. Joint management with the second wife has a positive and
significant relationship with labor, but no significant relationship with any of the other
outcomes. Although an increase in the number of wives is associated with less overall
fertilizer use, joint management with the first wife is associated with more fertilizer use.
Next, I examine the effect of polygyny and joint management on 2011 yield using another
cross-sectional regression. These results are shown in Table 4.4. Between 2009 and 2011,
although 92 percent of couples remained with the current number of spouses, six percent
of farmers added one wife to the union and 1.5 percent gained two or more wives. In
column (1), I observe that polygyny is associated with a statistically significant decrease
in maize yield. Although the coefficients on the number of wives are negative for fertilizer
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use, labor and crop value, they are not statistically significant.
Joint management with the first wife does not have a strong or consistent effect on
agricultural productivity or inputs. And despite large effect sizes for joint management
with the second wife, the standard errors of the estimates are also large and thus none
of the estimates are statistically significant.
In this estimation, I have added the interaction of joint management with the total
number of wives to understand the effect of wife one or two joint management and
conjunction with polygyny. The interaction of joint management with the second wife
and the total number of wives has a positive and significant relationship with crop value,
but the interaction terms generally do not have a significant or consistent effect on the
outcomes.
In a further cross-sectional estimation of the effect of polygyny on agriculture, Table
4.5 displays the effect of total wives in 2013 on agricultural productivity and inputs.
The number of wives in a household does not have a significant effect on maize yield,
agricultural inputs or crop value. The estimate of the effect of joint plot management
with the first wife is negative for all outcomes, but it is not significant. There is no
consistent or significant effect of joint management with the second wife. Likewise, the
interaction of joint management with either wife and the total number of wives does
not have a significant relationship with the outcomes.
Finally, I examine the effect of polygyny on agricultural productivity using a fixed effect
for the household, plot and crop. The results of this estimation are shown in Table 4.6.
The fixed effect term in this estimation captures the average levels of each household,
plot and crop, thus the resulting coefficients show the impact of the variation over time
of that household characteristic from its household-level mean. Thus, any covariate that
does not change over time is dropped from the regression. Eight percent of husbands
added a wife between 2009 and 2013. Sixteen percent of plots became jointly managed
with a wife between 2009 and 2013.
In Table 4.6, the total number of wives has a positive and significant effect on quantity
of agricultural labor. Perhaps due to the small amount of variation across the three
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waves and the large amount of variation captured by the fixed effect and due to large
standard errors, these estimations do not show a significant effect of changes in joint
management on yield, inputs or crop value. The coefficients on the joint management
effects are also not consistently positive or negative. Further, the interaction of joint
management with the number of total wives does not have any significant effect on the
outcomes.8 This table does not provide evidence of allocative inefficiency in farming.
Because this fixed effects estimation includes three observations for each household, plot
and crop over the time period, these estimated effects do not distinguish between actual
effects of polygyny and changes in household dynamics, or agricultural production over
time. For example, it is possible that the household acquired more social capital between
2009 and 2013, which contributed to higher quality labor inputs rather than the changes
in wives alone affecting labor inputs.
4.6 Conclusion
Polygyny can alter the bargaining power structure within a poor agricultural household
through resource competition or through cooperation and additional labor. I estimate
the effect of the number of wives in a household, wife order and joint plot management
on agricultural productivity for farming households in Tanzania. The results showing
the effect of polygyny itself on yield do not suggest inefficiency. The total number of
wives in a household has both positive and negative effects on yield, and these effects are
rarely statistically significant. The effect of polygyny also does not have a clear effect
on agricultural inputs or crop value. The few variables that did show some statistical
significance were not consistent across years of analysis. For example the effect of
polygyny on fertilizer use in 2009 is negative and significant, but the same estimation
is positive and insignificant in 2013.
I expected that joint management with the first wife would be associated with lower
8In the combined dataset, the interaction of joint management with the second wife and total wives
is 0 for 99.3% of plots. The fixed effect estimation results in perfect multicollinearity with another
variable in the regression, thus the second wife interaction term is dropped from the estimate.
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agricultural productivity and input allocation, as a reflection of inefficient allocation of
resources to plots that are (at least partly) managed by women. These results would
have been in agreement with (Udry, 1996). I also expected that joint management
with the second wife would have an inverse effect and would be associated with higher
yield and input allocation, as an indicator of focused efforts of the entire household on
that crop. However, I was not able to confirm this pattern in the empirical results.
Joint management with the first wife has a both positive and negative relationship with
the outcomes. Joint management with the second wife also shows both a positive and
negative relationship with the outcomes.
The policy implications of this research pertain to farming extension and education
services. Most extension services related to improved cultivation practices in Tanzania
are tailored to men as the main audience. However, because half of all plots in this
Tanzanian sample are managed by both husbands and wives, these extension services
should reach all members of the household. Improved seeds, use of fertilizer and good soil
practices all positively affect agricultural outcomes, regardless of plot manager. Despite
the existence of extension services in Tanzania, there remains a significant amount of
crop loss and missing yields in this farming data. All adult members of the household
would benefit from farming extension and education services.
The results in this study expand on the concept of intra-household bargaining power
by exploring marriages with more than two members. More research is needed to
better understand the effect of additional wives on agricultural productivity, perhaps in
samples with a larger sample of polygynous households and more variation in wives over
time. I have built on the literature in polygyny and agriculture by investigating Pareto
efficiency in polygynous households in East Africa, where the culture around household
hierarchy is different from that in West Africa. I have shown that, despite changes
in marital structure, these farming households do not exhibit signs of inefficiency as a
result of polygny and joint management.
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4.7 Tables
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics by Marital Status
Always Always Got monog. Gained Always
VARIABLES single mongamous married more wives polyg.
Yield (kg/acre) 297.17 345.05 370.81 323.17 357.81
(14.17) (12.16) (24.54) (28.08) (33.26)
Total wives 0 1.00 0.91 1.76 2.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Fertilizer used 0.24 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.20
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Farm size 3.48 6.20 6.44 8.77 8.14
(0.11) (0.16) (0.23) (0.51) (0.62)
Soil is good quality 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.50
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Log monthly consumption 10.26 10.18 10.27 10.16 10.32
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Plot is jointly managed 0.00 0.70 0.59 0.67 0.60
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 1,108 1,824 801 323 265
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4.2: Panel Descriptive Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES 2009 2011 2013
Yield (kg/acre) 326.503 323.814 354.278
(14.817) (11.309) (16.566)
Number of wives 0.778 0.841 0.900
(0.019) (0.016) (0.017)
Fertilizer used 0.279 0.306 0.304
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Log farmsize 5.242 5.636 6.431
(0.173) (0.152) (0.198)
Soil is good quality 0.515 0.468 0.464
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Log monthly household consumption 10.197 10.115 10.351
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014)
Plot is jointly managed 0.395 0.519 0.523
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 1,282 1,601 1,577
Standard deviations in parentheses
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Table 4.3: Cross-sectional 2009 Effect of Polygamy on Yield and Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Maize Fertilizer Labor Crop value
Number of wives 0.191 -0.796** -0.258* 0.155
(0.144) (0.334) (0.134) (0.174)
Joint management with wife 1 0.030 0.156* -0.032 0.107**
(0.063) (0.080) (0.032) (0.042)
Joint management with wife 2 -0.030 -0.966 0.462* -0.048
(0.265) (0.684) (0.274) (0.355)
Husband’s years of education 0.025*** 0.093*** -0.006 0.022***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.005) (0.006)
Log monthly consumption 0.102*** 0.447*** -0.040* 0.172***
(0.036) (0.056) (0.023) (0.030)
Husband and wife age difference 0.003 -0.006 -0.008*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Husband’s age -0.008*** 0.001 0.005*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Seeds were purchased -0.118 -0.033 -0.046 -0.138***
(0.089) (0.088) (0.035) (0.046)
Log farm size -0.182*** -0.087* -0.611*** -0.206***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.017) (0.026)
Traditional type of seed -0.143 -1.069*** 0.080 -0.425***
(0.088) (0.138) (0.056) (0.072)
Intercropped -0.182** -0.047 -0.256*** -0.504***
(0.089) (0.081) (0.032) (0.042)
Soil reported good 0.427** 0.315* 0.443*** 0.274***
(0.171) (0.187) (0.075) (0.097)
Some of crop was lost -0.062 -0.238*** 0.127*** -0.128***
(0.091) (0.080) (0.032) (0.042)
Quantity of fertilizer 0.060*** 0.012* 0.059***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009)
Quantity of labor 0.110** 0.076* 0.274***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.021)
Constant 4.792*** -2.368*** 5.261*** 8.379***
(0.472) (0.740) (0.284) (0.386)
Observations 1,318 3,696 3,696 3,685
R-squared 0.248 0.103 0.317 0.202
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1
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Table 4.4: Cross-sectional 2011 Effect of Polygamy on Yield and Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Maize Fertilizer Labor Crop value
Number of wives -0.625* -0.254 -0.115 -0.083
(0.353) (0.441) (0.246) (0.439)
Joint management with wife 1 0.132 -0.240 0.034 -0.007
(0.264) (0.409) (0.217) (0.238)
Joint management with wife 2 -0.514 0.231 0.508 -1.650
(1.800) (1.662) (1.161) (1.748)
Interaction of joint mgmt w wife 1 -0.133 -0.139 0.040 -0.037
and number of wives (0.232) (0.333) (0.142) (0.193)
Interaction of joint mgmt w wife 2 0.705 0.132 -0.134 1.175**
and number of wives (0.515) (0.682) (0.349) (0.519)
Seeds were purchased 0.357* 0.117 0.034 0.443**
(0.170) (0.256) (0.089) (0.162)
Log farm size -0.077 -0.010 -0.501*** 0.034
(0.071) (0.095) (0.045) (0.047)
Intercropped -0.119 0.345** -0.110 -0.379***
(0.083) (0.136) (0.069) (0.104)
Soil is good quality 0.144 0.107 0.002 0.416***
(0.145) (0.284) (0.169) (0.137)
Some of crop was lost -0.087 -0.032 -0.013 -0.046
(0.074) (0.249) (0.055) (0.074)
Log monthly consumption 0.119 0.117 0.073 0.140
(0.095) (0.301) (0.055) (0.092)
Husband and wife age diff 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.014**
(0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007)
Husband’s age -0.012** 0.001 0.006* -0.012**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005)
Husband’s years of education -0.024 0.081*** -0.009 0.004
(0.016) (0.024) (0.010) (0.011)
Quantity of fertilizer 0.042 0.058*** 0.028*
(0.024) (0.014) (0.015)
Quantity of labor 0.235*** 0.428*** 0.297***
(0.064) (0.122) (0.048)
Constant 3.911*** -2.013 3.559*** 6.971***
(0.947) (2.974) (0.693) (0.871)
Observations 480 808 808 808
R-squared 0.288 0.237 0.441 0.295
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.5: Cross-sectional 2013 Effect of Polygamy on Yield and Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Maize Fertilizer Labor Crop value
Number of wives 0.682 1.564 0.561 -0.150
(0.595) (1.459) (1.693) (0.722)
Joint management with wife 1 -0.086 -1.344 -0.723 -0.216
(0.438) (0.905) (0.578) (0.386)
Joint management with wife 2 -0.147 -4.086 3.088 2.198
(2.108) (5.474) (6.415) (1.695)
Interaction of joint mgmt wife 1 0.199 0.755 0.608 0.210
and number of wives (0.299) (0.650) (0.469) (0.292)
Interaction of joint mgmt wife 2 0.176 1.348 -0.754 -0.625
and number of wives (0.900) (1.927) (2.448) (0.607)
Seeds were purchased -0.089 -0.048 0.245 0.162
(0.206) (0.149) (0.274) (0.130)
Log farm size -0.362*** -0.149 0.043 -0.285***
(0.112) (0.110) (0.143) (0.069)
Intercropped 0.025 0.326 -0.167 -0.400***
(0.072) (0.282) (0.241) (0.109)
Soil is good quality 0.552** -0.296 0.644 0.521**
(0.224) (0.654) (0.395) (0.209)
Some of crop was lost -0.395** 0.280 0.325* -0.129
(0.186) (0.204) (0.181) (0.094)
Log monthly consumption 0.246 0.658*** 0.633*** 0.255**
(0.146) (0.121) (0.204) (0.103)
Husband and wife age diff -0.013 -0.018* 0.010 -0.003
(0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.009)
Husband’s age 0.000 -0.004 0.003 -0.001
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003)
Husband’s years education 0.006 0.071*** 0.082** 0.014
(0.035) (0.024) (0.036) (0.014)
Quantity of fertilizer 0.138*** -0.041 0.074***
(0.038) (0.081) (0.024)
Quantity of labor 0.088* -0.032 0.097***
(0.047) (0.062) (0.021)
Constant 0.977 -6.877*** -3.573 6.376***
(2.137) (1.694) (3.262) (1.372)
Observations 459 765 765 733
R-squared 0.315 0.314 0.163 0.323
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.6: 2009-2011-2013 Panel Effect of Polygamy on Yield with Household-
Crop-Plot Fixed Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Maize Fertilizer Labor Crop value
Number of wives 0.200 0.195 1.059*** 0.092
(0.247) (0.264) (0.285) (0.137)
Joint management w wife 1 0.020 0.829 -0.435 -0.123
(0.776) (0.789) (0.857) (0.402)
Joint management w wife 2 0.916 0.955 -0.887 0.485
(0.918) (0.927) (1.006) (0.473)
Interaction joint mgmt wife 1 -0.103 -0.805 0.552 0.060
and number of wives (0.771) (0.777) (0.843) (0.396)
Number of wives outside household -0.110 0.393* 0.985*** 0.148
(0.207) (0.228) (0.246) (0.117)
Seed type -0.062 0.184*** -0.152** -0.209***
(0.057) (0.065) (0.071) (0.034)
Log farm size -0.470*** -0.018 -0.407*** -0.265***
(0.062) (0.071) (0.077) (0.037)
Plot was intercropped 0.012 0.029 -0.084 -0.104**
(0.074) (0.092) (0.100) (0.047)
Soil is good quality 0.179 0.099 -0.081 0.082
(0.145) (0.160) (0.174) (0.082)
Crop loss -0.131* 0.079 0.062 -0.066
(0.075) (0.082) (0.089) (0.043)
Steep slope -0.155 -0.321 0.603** 0.046
(0.180) (0.219) (0.237) (0.113)
Soil is avg quality 0.181 0.027 -0.014 0.020
(0.139) (0.155) (0.168) (0.080)
Log monthly household consumption 0.010 0.312*** 0.520*** 0.122***
(0.063) (0.072) (0.077) (0.037)
Number of children 0.047 0.031 -0.023 0.010
(0.040) (0.045) (0.049) (0.024)
Quantity of fertilizer 0.054*** 0.082*** 0.066***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.010)
Quantity of labor -0.025 0.070*** 0.078***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.010)
Observations 2,249 4,125 4,125 4,002
R-squared 0.055 0.026 0.064 0.195
Number of id 832 1,558 1,558 1,521
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 *p<0.1
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation presents the results from three essays on the microeconomics of devel-
opment in Tanzania. The results and analysis contribute to a growing body of literature
about what works in economic development.
The randomized control trial in Chapter 2 shows the improved community family
planning education reduces excess fertility, providing support for the effectiveness of
community-based distribution of family planning services. The larger reduction in fer-
tility for women who received the family planning information alone provides evidence
of the benefit of reduced fertility. However, the improved communication and aligned
preferences for the couples intervention supports policy interventions that include both
husbands and wives together. The inclusion of husbands in education-focused consulta-
tions may reduce husbands’ fertility preferences, which may reduce fertility in the long
run, while and the exclusion of husbands in information and access-based consultations
may allow women to meet immediate demand for fertility control.
Chapter 3 shows that an entrepreneurship training program for unemployed youth in
Kagera has positive effects on financial literacy, confidence in employment and ability
to save. Despite the challenges of non-randomized evaluation, this study builds on a
large set of literature on the impacts of job training programs in the developing world.
This program focuses on the intermediary employment outcomes, such as attitudes and
98
99
perceptions, which provide insights into the mechanisms of employment trajectories for
youth participants.
Chapter 4 tests for allocative efficiency across plots in polygynous farming households
in Tanzania. It has been shown that polygyny can alter the bargaining power structure
within a poor agricultural household through resource competition or through coop-
eration. However, the estimates of the effect of the number of wives in a household,
wife order and joint plot management on agricultural productivity do not find any evi-
dence of inefficiency. Although this chapter explored the impact of polygyny, wife order
and joint management on yield, fertilizer, labor allocations and crop value, it found no
significant effects, either or negative.
The persistence of widespread poverty of Tanzania necessitates research to understand
microeconomic problems and to propose possible solutions. Fertility decisions, labor
market participation and agricultural productivity play important roles in the lives of
individuals and families and all three are potentially subject to problems of information,
lack of education and inefficiency. This dissertation explores ways to improve the lives of
Tanzanians and alleviate the burden of poverty through microeconomic research on the
three topics. I aim to bolster the public understanding of what works in development
using empirical analysis and evaluation. Microeconomic development that emphsizes
building capabilitiy and choice pays homage to the philosophy of early economists in
emphasizing individual worth and welfare as the preeminent purpose of the field of
economics.
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